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A Good Old Habit, or Just an Old One?
Preferential Tax Treatment for Reorganizations
Yariv Brauner
Abstract
This article proposes to repeal the preferential tax treatment of certain merger and
acquisition transactions known as “reorganizations,” and tax them like all other
sales or exchanges. In the last 80 years this preference has been a cornerstone
of our tax system. It is also one of the most stable rules in the tax code. Never-
theless, its normative justification is weak, and has never been rigorously debated
in the legal literature. This article rejects the stated rationale for this rules - that
such transactions trigger insufficient realization and therefore it is both unfair and
impractical to currently tax them. It further demonstrates that the preferential tax
treatment of reorganizations cannot be supported on efficiency grounds, apply-
ing the formerly unexploited (at least in the tax literature) wisdom available in
the economic, business and corporate law literature. The latter conclusion is the
primary contribution of this article.
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A Good Old Habit, or Just an Old One? Preferential Tax 
Treatment for Reorganizations 
Yariv Brauner*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC)1 contains some exceptional rules 
applying to corporate structural changes. These rules grant preferential 
tax treatment to a significant volume of merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transactions.2 Nevertheless, it is hard to establish a clear and 
comprehensive rationale for the current rules, which should be 
surprising, but is not so to any student of the material. Oddly enough, 
these rules are some of the most stable foundations of our federal tax 
system despite their shaky normative grounds. In this Article, I propose 
to repeal these rules and to tax “reorganization” transactions 3 like all 
other sales or exchanges. I reject the stated rationale for these rules—that 
such transactions trigger insufficient realization and, therefore, that it is 
both unfair and impractical to currently tax them. I further demonstrate 
that the preferential tax treatment of reorganizations cannot be supported 
on efficiency grounds.4 
In certain circumstances, the reorganization rules allow some 
taxpayers not to recognize (and therefore not to be currently taxed on) 
the gain they realize in these transactions. The “price” of such 
nonrecognition is usually some sort of carry-over tax basis, which, in 
effect, results in tax deferral and a timing preference for these taxpayers. 
For example, consider T, an individual inventor and a one hundred 
                                                 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. The author 
wishes to thank William Allen, Charlotte Crane, James Eustice, Kimberlee Hiatt, Zohar Goshen, 
Marcel Kahan, Shmuel Leshem, Paul McDaniel, Daniel Shaviro, John Steines, and Scott Waldman 
for their useful comments, assistance, and support —all mistakes are obviously mine. 
 1. Unless otherwise provided, all references are to the IRC and Treasury Regulations 
prescribed under it.  
 2. Mainly in I.R.C. §§ 354, 361, 368 (2000).   
 3. In this Article, I loosely use the term “reorganizations” to describe corporate structural 
changes that benefit from preferential tax treatment, following the § 368 definition of such 
transactions, but not necessarily one hundred percent in accord with its substantive content. 
 4. Although efficiency has not been explicitly stated as a justification for these rules, it has 
been raised indirectly as if it were an incontestable advantage of the reorganization provisions. See 
infra, Part III. 
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percent shareholder of InventCorp, a Delaware corporation that has 
developed and secured a patent on an invention. T agrees to merge 
InventCorp, under Delaware law, into IBM in exchange for one million 
dollars worth of IBM stock. Pursuant to the reorganization rules, she will 
not be taxed upon the transaction. Assuming normal start-up 
circumstances, T’s realized gain of close to one million dollars may be 
deferred until she disposes of the IBM stock received in the transaction, 
her basis in which is transferred from her InventCorp stock forgone in 
the merger.5 Note that if T received one million dollars in cash in the 
merger, or if she had developed the invention in her capacity as an 
individual, she would be currently taxed on her entire gain. This 
(deferral) preference may translate into indefinite deferral and to partial 
or complete avoidance of the tax.6 Nevertheless, this preference has been 
established over the last eighty years as a cornerstone of our federal 
income tax system. 
In this Article, I focus only on the primary acquisitive 
reorganizations: the type A statutory merger, the type B stock-for-stock 
acquisition, and the type C assets-for-stock acquisition. The rules 
governing corporate structural changes include a wide variety of other 
transactions that have many similar features for tax policy purposes,7 but 
the analysis of which must be deferred for methodological and 
simplification purposes. 
The common feature of all reorganization transactions and, as we 
will see shortly, the stated justification of the applicable tax rules, is that 
in these transactions either the core ownership group or the core 
business, or both, remain substantively the same but for a formal change 
that is justified by business reasons:  
The traditional theory . . . is that gain or loss should not be recognized 
on changes of form when the taxpayer’s investment remains in [the] 
corporate solution or when “a formal distribution . . . represents merely 
a new form of the previous participation in an enterprise involving no 
change of substance in the rights and relations of interested parties one 
                                                 
 5. Her basis amount is probably a negligible amount equal to her investment of money and 
property in InventCorp. I ignore this amount in this Article and consider it to be equal to zero. 
 6.  Complete avoidance was even easier prior to the 1986 repeal of the “General Utilities” 
doctrine.  Gen.  Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See also  Eric M. Zolt, The 
General Utilities Doctrine: Examining the Scope of the Repeal, 65 TAXES 819 (1987). 
 7. These are the rules applying to the organization of corporations (§ 351), termination of 
corporations in certain circumstances (§ 332 & § 337), and some other basic transactions affecting 
structural changes of corporations, primarily those falling into the definition of a “reorganization” (§ 
368). 
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to another or to the corporate assets.”8  
The courts and the business community have never questioned the 
logic of these rules. The government has attempted, from time to time, to 
analyze some of their specific details, but except for a short episode in 
the 1930s, it has not made a serious attempt to conceptually revise, or 
even review the normative foundation of, these rules. The legislature has 
consistently concentrated on shutting down abuse potentials rather than 
questioning the basic premises behind this tax regime. The result is an 
extremely stable (but stagnant) regime that is resistant to change despite 
its inadequacies, which are exposed mainly by academics.9 The resulting 
system, described by one scholar, consists of “a variety of patterns of 
taxation [that] have emerged through largely uncoordinated, ad hoc 
legislative and judicial development . . . containing unsupportable 
distinctions and inconsistencies, [which are] massively complex.”10 This 
harsh description is not surprising to anyone exposed to this notoriously 
“complex and cryptic”11 regime, but general industry satisfaction has 
evidently been sufficient to ensure the retention of this major part of our 
tax law. 
Part II follows with an analysis, and rejection, of the stated, 
realization-based rationale for the reorganization rules. It demonstrates 
that the reasons for adopting the realization requirement itself, mainly 
liquidity concerns and valuation hardship, are either irrelevant or cannot 
support the argument that the tax preference to reorganizations is 
necessary to maintain the integrity of the realization requirement as a 
fundamental feature of the federal income tax.12 
                                                 
 8. BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE , FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 12.01[3] (7th. ed., 2000) (citing in part Bazley v. C.I.R., 331 U.S. 737, 740 
reh’g denied, 332 U.S. 752 (1947)). 
 9. Jerome R. Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism , 71 HARV. L. REV. 254, 276 (1957); 
William A. Lovett, Tax Subsidies for Merger: Should Mergers be Made to Meet a Ma rket Test for 
Efficiency? , 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844 (1970). 
 10. Glenn E. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal For Mandatory Uniform 
Rules, 44 TAX L. REV. 145, 146 (1989). 
 11. Milton Sandberg, THE INCOME TAX SUBSIDY TO “REORGANIZATIONS,” 38 COLUM. L. 
REV. 98, 98 (1938). 
 12. I base my analysis on the conclusions I reached in my historical analysis presented in the 
Appendix for the benefit of the inexperienced tax reader. The Appendix reviews the historical 
development and evolution of reorganizations. It further presents the few criticisms of this regime as 
developed throughout the years. The argument that the reorganization rules evolved through a rigid 
prism of a realizatio n-based income tax, devoted to the maintenance of realization as the 
fundamental feature of the system was first observed by Professor Steven A. Bank, in: Mergers, 
Taxes, and Historical Realism , 75 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2000). Bank disposed of other rhetorical and 
historical arguments for reorganization rules, including: Pressure to revive the depressed post -World 
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Part III analyzes the argument that another purpose of the 
reorganization provisions could have been the generation of efficiency 
benefits. This argument, normally stated in negative terms, has been that, 
without these rules, the tax system would have restricted socially 
beneficial transactions.13 In this part, I first reconstruct and then 
challenge this argument, which has not been methodically established in 
legal academic literature. Fortunately, there is a significant body of 
economic, business, and corporate law M&A literature that provides 
empirical and theoretical bases for this analysis. I also try to set a 
reasonable framework for future study of this issue. The conclusion of 
this analysis is that efficiency justifications cannot support the current 
reorganizations rules since these rules apply to (and benefit) only some 
M&A transactions, which may not necessarily be the most efficient 
M&A transactions. Moreover, it is likely that these rules do not actually 
play a significant role even in the materialization of the transactions they 
are supposed to encourage. Their effect, therefore, is that of a subsidy to 
certain participants in M&A transactions—an arbitrary, unfocused, and 
hard-to-justify subsidy. In light of the significant costs and 
ineffectiveness of such a subsidy, it is unlikely to be efficient. 
Finally, Part IV concludes with a proposition to completely repeal 
the reorganization provisions. I suggest that this will result in significant 
simplicity and efficiency gains, and that such a repeal is not unfair. 
Standard policy grounds cannot support the current regime, which adds 
substantial complexity to our tax system.14 
This Article is based on some strong assumptions. It assumes no 
critical change in the current U.S. status quo regarding the optimal size 
of the government, as well as the retention of the income tax and its 
current realization-based version as the primary federal method of 
taxation. 15 Additionally, I assume that the United States will continue to 
insist on preserving the classical corporate tax.16 
                                                                                                             
War I economy resulted in many measures, including easement of taxation of business and business 
combinations. One of these measures was the enactment of the reorganization provisions that 
remained substantially unchanged until these days, many years after those harsh economic pressures. 
See also Lovett, supra  note 9, at 852. 
 13. The argument is implied in the legislative history and the academic literat ure. Lovett, 
supra  note 9, at 851–52. 
 14. I note that it is a mistake, from a policy perspective, to keep an unjustified current regime 
just because we are short of effective, predictive tools to choose the “best” of available alternatives 
where we do know that all of these alternatives are better than the current regime. 
 15. For example, that there is no switch to a federal consumption tax. See, e.g ., JOEL 
SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 199–236 (2000) (reviewing and summarizing the 
advantages and disadvantages of different U.S. proposals); ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art23
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The various regimes in Subchapter C of the Tax Code are all 
interwoven in their complexity and must be untangled, one by one, in 
order to allow real progress. This strategy allows us to ameliorate the risk 
of irrelevant resistance, political or other. My proposal to repeal the 
                                                                                                             
TAX REFORM (Henry J. Aaron & William S. Gale eds., 1996) (also discussing various proposals for 
U.S. tax reform). 
 16. It may be useful to clarify the importance of this last assumption. Clearly, corporations 
serve a central role in the current western economy. More than half of the U.S. GDP originates in 
real corporations.  Council of Econ. Advisors, Economic Report of the President, 1999, 306, 322, 
available at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/pdf/2000_erp.pdf. Corporations are fictional 
“legal entities,” treated ambivalently by the law. In some circumstances, their legal treatment equals 
the treatment of real (flesh-and-blood) persons, and, in others, it differs. Similar ambivalence exists 
in tax. The rhetoric of the corporate tax is that it taxes corporations as separate legal persons. This is 
the essence of a “classical” corporate tax system. Nevertheless, the IRC develops a separate and 
different set of rules for this tax—with independent tax rates, brackets, etc.—for corporations (i.e. 
corporations are not actually taxed as if they were human). This lack of consistency is hard to justify 
intelligently. The current corporate tax is the product of sets of rules developed and tampered with 
over the years depending on the political and economic setting. It is important to remember, 
nevertheless, the revenue scope of this tax. It accounts for no more than 10 percent of federal tax 
collections.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, T HE BUDGET AND ECON. OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2004-2013 
tbl. F-3 (2003) available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1821&sequence=0.  
Interestingly, the pattern I show here with respect to reorganizations, i.e., staple rules without sound 
rationale or rigid original assessment of the reason for their legislation, is similar to the pattern seen 
in the legislation of the corporate tax itself. See Robert Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: 
An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform , 87 YALE L. J. 90, 97 n.20 (1977). What is wrong with 
the corporate tax? In principle, we all know that corporations, being fictional, do not pay taxes, only 
real people do. This cliché means that only flesh -and-blood persons can bear the economic burden of 
taxation. The corporate tax, therefore, distorts the choice of organization form. For further insights, 
see, for instance, the discussion by Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the 
Price of Incorporation , 77 VA. L. REV 211 (1991).  Then what is the corporate tax? One way to look 
at it is as a means of collection, like a withholding tax system. In a similar sense, it supports the 
integrity of the individual income tax in that it does not generally tax retained earnings of the 
corporation at the level of the shareholders at the time these earnings are generated, Clark, supra 
note 16, at 101–03, although this is, obviously, not a necessary feature of the system. Another 
common justification for the corporate tax is that it compensates society for certain special privileges 
it provides corporations, mainly the limited liability for their shareholders. The most elementary, and 
probably the most important, justification for the corporate tax is that large corporations do operate 
as separate persons; they exemplify real separat ion of management from ownership, with very little 
(to no) weight given to whom the shareholders of the corporation are at any given time. This trend 
will only grow in extent as capital markets develop and become more sophisticated. Nevertheless, 
clearly, the “classical” corporate tax is distortive; it is not neutral since it creates a mix of incentives 
and disincentives to invest in corporate business and/or capital. This and other arguments for and 
against the corporate tax have been extensively developed elsewhere, and several proposals to 
replace the corporate tax, or at least to introduce integration of the corporate tax and the taxation of 
corporate distributions, have been made and rejected in the United States throughout the years. See, 
e.g. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ AND ALVIN C. WARREN JR., INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE AND 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 
REPORTS (Tax Analysts, 1998).) I do not attempt, therefore, to challenge the stability of the U.S. 
corporate tax, as such, but, rather, to challenge a particularly wasteful part of it —the corporate 
reorganization rules. 
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reorganization preferences offers progress, but should not be mistaken to 
be a tax reform proposal that amends fundamental bases of the system. 
Fundamental tax reforms are scarce, partly due to the effectiveness of 
opposition that may not be directed at the whole reform project, but 
rather at only some of its parts. An all-or-nothing approach (such as the 
inclination to adopt the whole reform or nothing) in tax may, at best, 
achieve a disappointing compromise;17 in reality, it usually achieves 
nothing, encouraging stagnation and inefficiency. 
II. THE REALIZATION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT SUPPORT 
NONRECOGNITION FOR REORGANIZATIONS 
The traditional, stated justification for reorganization preferences 
arises from the intuition that the subject transactions do not trigger 
sufficient realization to justify their current taxation. 18 Our federal 
income tax system is a realization-based system. It is also a mixed 
system—part accretion tax, taxing income arising from capital, and part 
consumption tax, exempting (or deferring) such income.19 It is based on 
income, with significant deviations from the classical economic 
understanding of income,20 primarily through the realization requirement 
for recognition of income and its taxation. The realization requirement 
has been casuistically developed throughout the years.21 Currently, it is 
well established in the regulations and other administrative materials that 
in order to tax a taxpayer on any appreciation in value of her property, a 
                                                 
 17. The tax reform of 1986 is a good, though clearly extraordinary, example for this 
argument. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH : 
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).  
 18. Bank, supra  note 12, at 12–13. (Explaining that the favorable treatment of reorganization 
transactions is part of the compromise between the consumption and accretion models of taxation, 
which currently construct our federal tax system. He adds that given the continuous struggle between 
these two models, it is still a logical part of the compromise.). Professor Bank mentions three 
arguments used to support tax free reorganizations: (1) They are pure “paper gains” and therefore 
should not be taxed, (2) They are justified as a post World-War I economic revival measurement, 
and (3) It is administratively difficult to tax reorganizations.  Id. at 12–13.  He argues that, 
eventually, it all boils down to realization. I fully agree with this important observation, though, 
clearly, not with his conclusion. See also  Clark, supra  note 16, at 117–18. 
 19. Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under 
the Federal Income Tax , 48 TAX L. REV. 1 (1992). 
 20. This is the sum of change in net wealth, plus consumption, known as the Schanz-Haig-
Simons definition of income [hereinafter SHS definition of income]. ROBERT M. HAIG, THE 
FEDERAL INCOME T AX (1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938); GEORG 
VON SCHANZ, DER EINKOMMENSBEGRIFF UND DIE EINKOMMENSTEUERGESETZE, 13 Finanz-Archiv 
1 (1896). 
 21. Dating back to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
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realization event must take place first.  Such an event occurs when there 
is a “material change” in the investment or property held by the taxpayer. 
22  In the case of T, our invention shareholder, for example, the exchange 
of her InventCorp stock for IBM stock constitutes such a mate rial change 
and therefore is a realization event. 
The realization requirement is considered necessary, since without it, 
valuation hardship and liquidity concerns may arise and cause the system 
to be perceived as unfair.23 Coming back to T, prior to the merger it may 
be perceived as unfair to tax her on theoretical appreciation in her 
InventCorp stock due to her success in completing her invention project, 
since, like many other entrepreneurs, she had no cash at that point in time 
and the value of her shares was practically impossible to accurately 
estimate. Nevertheless, I argue that neither of these basic justifications 
for a general realization requirement in our income tax system can be 
extended to justify an exception (nonrecognition resulting in further 
deferral) to the standard application of this requirement for 
reorganization transactions (T can easily sell her IBM shares for cash 
now, and the value of her shares will be determined in a market 
transaction). In this section, I echo past criticism of these justifications 
and make some additional observations that support such criticism. 
A. The Prevalence of Realization as a Fundamental Concept  
in Our Tax System and the Creation of Mixed Signals  
in the Reorganization Preference  
A realization event does not create income, but rather serves as a 
convenient point in time in which income can be measured and added to 
the potential tax base of a taxpayer. It is understandable, therefore, that 
two concerns are constantly raised in connection with this requirement—
valuation and liquidity. If the tax system does not wait for a 
transaction—a realization event, well defined in both time and real 
terms—it might be very hard and costly to annually assign the right value 
to each relevant item of income for the purpose of tax assessment. 
Moreover, once a transaction is effected, the taxpayer materializes her 
                                                 
 22. Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 556 (1991) (explaining that an exchange of 
property gives rise to a realization event when the exchanged properties are “materially different”—
meaning they embody legally distinct entitlements); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended 1996).  
 23. For some time, realization was even considered a constitutional requirement by the 
Supreme Court, which has eventually downgraded it to administrative convenience or, as some may 
say, a necessary evil. David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1552 
(1998). 
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investment and potentially receives funds to pay the appropriate tax on it; 
however, this may not be the case in a reorganization transaction where 
the taxpayer has not yet cashed out. This latter (liquidity) argument is 
really two-pronged: first, the taxpayer should have enough funds to 
physically pay the tax; and, second, it is possible to argue that she must 
be able to pay the tax from the same income on which it is levied. This 
latter rationale, based on fairness intuitions, obviously ignores the 
fungible characteristics of money, but may be strong politically since it 
allows a taxpayer to feel safe that she does not have to “bring money 
from home” in order to pay taxes on transactions in which she engages. 
These intuitions follow the transaction tax features of our income tax 
system. The schizophrenia of our system allows the reorganization 
provisions to be presented as fair even though in reality they represent a 
benefit granted discriminately to the more affluent in our society.24 
It is useful for our purposes to compare the realization-based income 
tax with a pure mark-to-market tax system, under which personal wealth 
would be valued and taxed annually,25 since the reorganization 
preferences represent a (favorable) exemption from the general rule of 
realization and the mark-to-market system represents a less favorable 
alternative regime than baseline realization itself. This comparison 
should put into context the extent of beneficial treatment embedded in 
the reorganization provisions. A mark-to-market system would be hard to 
implement. Although valuation methods have improved significantly, 
they are still quite inaccurate when it comes to some assets. Moreover, 
the values of some assets are traditionally subject to significant volatility, 
which adds to the inaccuracy of the process and to its relatively large 
exposure to abuse by taxpayers. A realization-based system, on the other 
hand, partially26 avoids the need and costs of valuation, since it uses the 
transaction’s market price. A pure mark-to-market system may require a 
taxpayer who holds an appreciated asset to pay tax on it before she has 
sold the asset, which may force her to sell the item in order to have the 
cash to pay the tax. This last scenario arguably shows the distortive 
potential effects of an income tax system that is not based on realization, 
since the latter is closer to a cash-flow tax. It does not require a taxpayer 
                                                 
 24. See, e.g., Greg Ip, Boom, Bust Felt Mainly by the Rich, WALL ST. J, January 23, 2003 at 
D2. 
 25. This system would be the direct result the elimination of the realization requirement from 
the current system. 
 26. The valuation problem is not completely avoided since many transactions involve related 
parties, thus forcing even a realization-based system to use some valuation trickery to ensure the use 
of the “right” price. 
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to pay tax before she actually realizes her wealth. Appreciation of assets, 
under this logic, is only potential income, and it materializes only when 
the taxpayer cashes in her investment (sells the asset). It is apparent, 
therefore, that the deferral benefit of nonrecognition for reorganizations 
is an excessive benefit, in addition to the deferral benefit inherent in a 
realization-based system, if we take a mark-to-market system as the 
baseline for the analysis. 
Rich literature analyzing potential alternatives to the realization-
based income tax system exists,27 followed by recent prorealization 
literature countering such analysis.28 The success of the critical literature 
has been, at most, limited to application of accretion-based assessment 
provisions to specific items of income, either mandatory or by election. It 
is reasonable to assume that this evolutionary process will persist, but 
that complete replacement of the realization-based system is unlikely. 
For the purposes of this Article this assumption suffices.29 The messiness 
of our tax system, comprised of a hodgepodge of provisions that affect 
the timing of taxation of certain income in various ways, all of which 
deviate from the baseline of realization but not in any apparently 
consistent or coherent way, is exposed. These provisions apply to the 
same income items, but they sometimes cancel each other out, partially 
or completely, without sufficient justification. If we concentrate on the 
deferral benefit of the realization concept, we acknowledge a general 
preference that the tax system provides to investment and savings. 
Certain types of investments, mainly in the financia l area, are explicitly 
denied this preference,30 while other, not substantially different, 
                                                 
 27. See, e.g ., David Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual 
Taxation , 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986). 
 28. Edward Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the 
Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (concluding that, choosing de novo, we 
should elect realization rather than accretionism as a fundamental premise upon which to construct 
an income tax, since its virtues are attainable and the appeal of accretionism is theoretical and 
proved wrong when applied in the past; further arguing that accretionism can be applied, at most, 
sectorally and never universally, as realization can be applied.). Schizer, supra  note 23 (The author 
argues that realization is a subsidy for private savings and investments, assuming that such a subsidy 
is desirable. He concludes that, because it is credible, realization has a significant advantage as a 
subsidy despite its disadvantages—mainly inefficiency. He adds that a pivotal reason for its stability 
is that it doubles as a rule of administrative convenience.). 
 29. I do not intend to evaluate, or criticize, the possible alternatives to a realization-based 
income tax system, as it has been ably done on several other occasions. I focus only on those aspects 
that relate to reorganization transactions. 
 30. I.R.C. § 475 (2000) (mark to market accounting method for dealers in securities); I.R.C. § 
817 (2000) (treatment of variable contracts); I.R.C. § 1256 (2000)(marking to market certain 
contracts). 
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transactions are granted an increased preference, since they are able to 
elect between realization and mark-to-market regimes.31 From this 
perspective, the signals of the system are hard to decipher. It gets even 
worse: other types of nonrecognition transactions, including 
reorganizations, receive increased (deferral) preference.32 With respect to 
these transactions, the code signals dissatisfaction with the technical 
rules of realization by stating that these transactions should not be taxed 
even though realization has occurred. The inference is that the realization 
in these transactions is not strong enough. Instead of modifying the 
standard for realization, the code has constructed another (similar) layer 
called “recognition.” Normally, recognition follows realization 
automatically,33 but in certain cases it does not, further extending the 
deferral preference. This extension is particularly extravagant with 
respect to corporate reorganizations.34 After demonstrating the 
extraordinarily beneficial treatment of reorganizations in a system 
lacking satisfactory coherence, I present the stated argument for this 
preference, followed by its evaluation. 
B. The Argument that Reorganizations Do Not Trigger “Sufficient” 
Realization  
Shareholders in target corporations who exchange their shares for 
something materia lly different from those shares experience a realization 
event.35 All of the basic transactions would trigger realization and 
recognition of gains under Section 1001(c) if it were not for the 
reorganization provisions. The rationale for the provisions is that even 
                                                 
 31. I.R.C. § 460 (2000) (long-term contracts); I.R.C. § 475; I.R.C. § 1092 (2000) (straddle 
rules); I.R.C. § 1291 (2000) (passive foreign investment companies). 
 32. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 354, 361, 1031(2000). 
 33. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2000). 
 34. In order to fully understand the effect of the special tax preference to reorganizations, we 
must start with an understanding of the tax effects of the corporate tax subsystem. This is again 
another mess of mixed signals of incentives and disincentives in relation to a baseline of the SHS 
definition of income. In this Article, I take the reasonable assumptio n that we have, and will 
continue to have, a classical corporate tax system. The basic effects of such a sy stem are another 
level of taxation of investments in corporate capital on one hand (the corporate tax) and a convenient 
deferral opportunity on the other. Careful planning may allow not only the deferral of taxation of 
these proceeds, but also its avoidance. The reorganization provisions magnify this deferral 
preference, extending it beyond standard realization-capped periods. 
 35. This is true for shareholders of a target corporation in a merger, a stock-for-stock 
transaction, and an assets-for-stock transaction. In the latter case, the shareholders in the target 
corporation end up with stock from the acquiring corporation, which, in turn, acquires substantially 
all the assets of the target corporation, which disappears in the process. 
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though technical realization may happen, i.e., shares or assets of one 
corporation are exchanged for shares in another corporation, that 
realization did not happen substantively since the value in the hands of 
the exchanging shareholders did not change. Moreover, the same 
business continues, and the same shareholders continue to own it, though 
now maybe through the gossamer veil of a paper we call a corporation.  
The technique used to implement this justice of not taxing shareholders 
undergoing reorganization without frustrating the integrity of the 
realization definition is to not recognize the income arising from the 
transaction. It is easy to see, nevertheless, that the changes effected in 
reorganizations are material. For example, look at the stock-for-stock, 
type B reorganization. It cannot be true that the exchanging shareholders 
of the target corporation get an equivalent investment, as they have 
diversified their investment by combining their business with another 
business. The case of T and her exchange of InventCorp stock for IBM 
stock in the merger is no different. If the result is otherwise, the 
transaction should not have been entered into in the first place.36 
C. Analysis of the Realization-Based Rationale for Reorganizations 
 Evaluation of the current reorganization provisions in light of the 
realization-based justification is problematic because realization itself is 
an elusive and sometimes vague (and even indefensible) concept. Some 
observations can, nevertheless, be made. 
1. Valuation hardships 
The concern over valuation does not support the extension of the 
realization preference to the case of reorganizations. Since any 
reorganization technically triggers realization, there is a visible market 
price used in the underlying transaction that can be properly used to 
determine the gains or losses realized. At least in the context of unrelated 
parties, this is one point in time when an arms-length price may be 
established and monitored by methods already employed by the code 
with respect to taxable acquisitions.37 In the related parties context, the 
extraction of an arms-length price may be more difficult, but, again, we 
have specific provisions in the code to deal with such situations.38 It may 
                                                 
 36. I obviously ignore purely tax-motivated reorganizations here. 
 37. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1060 (2000). 
 38. I.R.C. § 482 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (as amended in 2003). These provisions do 
require some special valuation and enforcement costs; the tax authorities must understand the scope 
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be argued that as we postpone the taxing event we may be in a better 
position to accurately evaluate the future market value,39 but in the case 
of corporations with long horizons this argument is less convincing. The 
taxpayer sees only the price that she could currently realize in cash 
terms.40  
As market prices are readily available, publicly traded stocks and 
securities pose no valuation problem. A theoretical valuation problem 
may arise, therefore, only when purely nonpublicly traded securities are 
exchanged.41 These cases should be relatively low in number in 
comparison with exchanges in reorganizations that involve publicly 
traded stock. Nevertheless, in most transactions it does not seem to be 
very problematic to implement some basic rules that will preserve the 
integrity of any valuation method allowed, following accepted methods 
already found in other sections of the code. First, the parties to the 
transaction must file reports that are consistent with each other. Second, 
certain indicia must be reported, such as information about prior private 
financing. Finally, if the taxpayer fails to satisfy the authorities, then the 
taxpayer will bear the costs of a valuation audit. These provisions should 
ameliorate the possible problems of valuation in the rare cases where it is 
not simple to figure out. 
Another possible problem may be the valuation of different bus iness 
assets exchanged in stock-for-assets transactions. This difficulty and 
possible innovative solutions have been ably discussed elsewhere.42 For 
the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that even without major 
changes the code and regulations already provide specific rules sufficient 
to regulate this issue should the reorganization provisions be repealed.43 
                                                                                                             
of the transactions, so they may need to inquire into the whole set of relationships between the 
parties to the transaction. 
 39. This is because the future market value is the present value of future inputs. 
 40. It is possible to argue that this price may not be well reflected in the transaction 
documents. 
 41. Even in these cases there are ways to value the stock. See Shakow, supra  note 27, at 1133 
–34 (reviewing some of these methods). Shakow, nevertheless, concludes that these alternative 
methods are probably not very effective and prefers an ambitious revolution in our tax system—
elimination of the corporate tax or integration of the corporate tax with tax on corporate 
distributions. Id. at 1136–37. I prefer to limit this Article to a less ambitious scope. I would put the 
valuation onus on the taxpayers. In most cases of unrelated parties the market should be able to 
guard the right price, as in the current § 1060 provisions.  
 42. Shakow, supra  note 27, at 1154–67. . 
 43. I.R.C. §§ 338, 1060 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.338 (as amended in 2003); Treas. Reg. § 
1.1060 (as amended in 2003). 
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2. Liquidity concerns 
Liquidity concerns may be more relevant to reorganizations than the 
valuation concerns. The reorganization tax preference is exclusive to 
transactions that use the stock of the acquiring corporation to compensate 
the target shareholders for their shares of the target corporation.44 A 
target shareholder does not get any preference for cash received in the 
reorganization. Stock financing is a legitimate, and sometimes 
reasonable, form of financing an M&A transaction. But in many cases, 
the tax preference itself provides the strong incentive to use stock rather 
than cash transactions, no matter what method of financing is preferable 
pretax. In these cases, the liquidity concern can be quite contrived and 
has no place in a serious policy analysis. It is undesirable, therefore, to 
try and base a rule on taxpayers’ motivations here, so in order to dismiss 
this argument I must determine whether the liquidity concerns are serious 
in the nontax-driven cases. 
Liquidity concerns are nonexistent in cases of publicly traded stock 
and securities received by the target corporation’s shareholders.45 In the 
case of transactions involving private corporations, a more careful look is 
appropriate, since private corporations potentially include small 
businesses and shareholders with possible real cash-flow concerns. From 
the perspective of the main benefactors of the preferential tax treatment 
of the reorganization provisions (the target shareholders),46 the only 
relevant case is when nonpublicly traded stock and securities are 
exchanged for similar properties. The exchange of publicly traded stock 
and securities for nonpublicly traded stock and securities is possible, but 
unique. This latter situation signals financial strength on the side of the 
taxpayers receiving stock and therefore presents no real liquidity 
concerns. However, even the pure exchange of nonpublicly traded stock 
                                                 
 44. Note that this is the case in all three relevant reorganizat ions—types A, B, and C. In a 
merger, it is straightforward, likewise in a stock-for-stock reorganization. In an assets-for-stock 
reorganization, it is practically the same because of the requirement that the target corporation 
selling its assets must be liquidated. 
 45. Shakow, in his proposal to replace our realization-based system with a mostly accrual 
system, has already discussed this. He emphasizes that corporate equities accounted for 10.5 percent 
of all assets held by individuals, out of which almost eighty-five percent were publicly traded stock.  
See supra  note 27, at 1132–33.  This portion should be even more substantial when reorganizations 
are involved. 
 46. The other prima facie “benefactor” of the nonrecognition of the realization event is the 
acquiring corporation. This is, nevertheless, an issue unrelated to reorganization since § 1032, which 
I do not tamper with in this Article, provides for nonrecognition to any corporation issuing stock for 
other property, whether a reorganization is effected or not. For further discussion, see, Part IV infra. 
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and securities is likely to involve mainly the wealthiest taxpayers in our 
society.47 The problem, therefore, cannot be technical inaccessibility to 
cash. Even if it were, it could be solved by postponing payment of the tax 
and adding some interest charge.48 This solution can also be used where 
it is determined that real liquidity concerns exist in transactions involving 
private corporations.49 
A somewhat related argument may be that taxpayers perceive it as 
unfair to levy a tax prior to their cashing out. This perception may be 
problematic only if it represents a real liquidity problem. The perception 
itself may have some political bearing but should not concern us in this 
normative analysis.50 
3. Realization as a credible subsidy to savings 
Professor Schizer argues that realization may be a desirable subsidy 
to private savings and investment because of its credibility.51 In the 
context of reorganizations, there is no doubt that it acts as a very credible 
subsidy to certain investments in corporations. The question is whether it 
                                                 
 47. Exceptional cases may involve amalgamations of small businesses and employee-owned 
corporations. 
 48. This technical solution resembles in principle one of the more interesting alternatives to 
realization—based taxation—retrospective taxation plus interest charge. An advantage of this 
solution is that it mitigates the liquidity concern without introducing new significant distortions to 
the market for corporate control. For a discussion of this possible solution, see Shakow, supra  note 
27, at 1176, in the context of his proposal to switch to an accrual tax sy stem. See also  Cynthia Blum, 
New Role for the Treasury: Charging Interest on Tax Deferral Loans, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 
(1988). For criticism, see Schizer, supra note 23. 
 49. It is a bad idea to apply different treatment to public and private corporations. See 
discussion in Bank, supra  note 12, at 42–43. 
 50. Only real liquidity concerns justify realization-based rationales. Another fairness 
argument raised in connection with the liquidity argument is that taxing M&A transactions is too 
oppressive on a small corporate shareholder who did not necessarily support the transaction and now 
must sell her stock in order to pay the tax. Crockett suggests that this problem, if it arises, be solved 
in the same way the code treats other involuntary transactions. Ulysses S. Crockett, Jr., Federal 
Taxation of Corporate Unifications: A Review of Legislative Policy, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1976). He 
refers, in footnote 112, to § 1033, which provides nonrecognition to taxpayers who suffer 
compulsory or involuntary conversion of their property if they replace it, within a specified period, 
with similar property. I do not think such a solution is necessary from a fairness perspective, since 
such a taxpayer had to take this possibility into account ex-ante. Such a taxpayer does not 
necessarily have a liquidity problem. I am not convinced by this fairness argument, but I do 
understand that it might be raised as part of the political legislative process. Crockett’s solution, 
therefore, may be useful in this context, if required. It is not as harmful if applied only to true 
minority shareholders, since they do not drive M&A transactions; therefore, the  distorted effects 
would be minor, at most. 
 51. For example, its stability as a fundamental concept in our tax system throughout so many 
years, and the unlikelihood of any change in that stability. Schizer , supra note 23. 
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is a desirable or an effective subsidy. The answer in the case of 
reorganizations is different from Schizer’s positive answer with respect 
to realization in general, since reorganizations are an exception to the 
regular realization rule. They benefit a different (more exclusive and 
richer) taxpayer group. Furthermore, I show in Part III that the 
reorganization provisions are not, in actuality, an effective subsidy to 
investments, since desired M&A transactions take place notwithstanding 
their existence. The fact that realization doubles as a rule of 
administrative convenience supports its stability and possible 
desirability. The same is not true with respect to the desirability of the 
reorganization preferences because of their complexity, significant 
evasion opportunity, and significant costs of their enforcement. Schizer 
himself mentions several disadvantages of realization as a subs idy—
disadvantages that weigh even more against reorganization 
preferences.52 
D. Realization and Perceptions of Fairness 
Some argue that it is politically unrealistic to repeal the realization 
requirement.53 The reason for this reality is that there are basic irrational 
fairness perceptions among taxpayers.54 Professor Zelinsky argues that 
“[s]ince realization-based taxation is instinctively correct to many, if not 
most, taxpayers, [it] enhances both democratic values and taxpayer 
compliance.”55 He backs this argument with behavioral psychology 
theories of framing effects.56 This should not affect my analysis and 
proposal, since there is no parallel between the perceptions of realization 
and the perceptions of reorganization preferences, which represent an 
exception to realization. The effect of these reorganization preferences is, 
simply put, deferral of taxation of investors in corporations. Much of that 
                                                 
 52. These are: (1) Inoptimal allocation of resources (as I analy ze in part IV); (2) The fact that 
effectiveness varies with the capital gains rate; (3) The fact that it is less credible than an upfront 
subsidy, possibly ineffective and counterproductive—surely the reorganization provisions are, as I 
analyze in part IV; and (4) The fact that realization favors “growth” stock over debt and “income” 
stock. This is particularly severe in reorganizations. Taxation will not solve the debt-equity 
distortion but will ameliorate it and eliminate the distortion to “income” stock. Additionally, it does 
not address a specific market failure that justifies intervention—that there is not enough savings 
mainly because the government taxes income rather than consumption and runs a budget deficit, etc. 
Schizer, supra note 23, at 1609–10, 1612, 1617–18, 1621–22. 
 53. Shaviro, supra note 19. 
 54. Zelinsky, supra  note 28, at 893–900. 
 55. Id. at 893. 
 56. Id. at 898–900 .  
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is due to the notorious wasteful complexity and exclusive planning 
opportunities reorganization preferences introduce to the system. It 
would be preposterous to argue that reorganization preferences enhance 
democratic values and compliance, since they represent the exact 
opposite: inequality in treatment of interchangeable types of investments 
and the epitome of tax planning. 
III. EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TAX-FREE REORGANIZATIONS 
Efficiency has not been explicitly stated in the legislative history as a 
justification for the enactment, or preservation, of the reorganization 
provisions. The legislative history took for granted that the 
reorganization provisions allow businesses flexibility and promote 
efficient transactions. This “intuition” was present in all the relevant 
debates but never directly studied or discussed.57 Reading between the 
lines, however, proves that this “intuition” materially contributed to the 
stability of the reorganization provisions.58 They continued to evolve and 
develop, endogenously, without any rethinking or evaluation of their 
actual consequences.59 
In this section I challenge the validity of this assumption—that the 
reorganization provisions encourage efficiency—as a justification for 
their continuance. For this purpose, I depend on the extensive empirical 
and other economic, business, and corporate law M&A literature of the 
past two decades. The standard analysis of takeovers is based on the fact 
that internal growth is difficult, especially when it is needed to cover, or 
recover from, corporate underperformance. Therefore, corporations 
direct their growth efforts to the market for corporate control—a more 
flexible market than the product market. In some cases, some industries’ 
needs for an overhaul restructuring (since they face deregulation, for 
instance) triggered or reinforced their redirection to the market for 
                                                 
 57. It has not been seriously studied even by academics. Professor Lovett argued that mergers 
should meet a market test for efficiency, but he has not comprehensively detected the actual 
efficiency consequences of mergers. It should be noted that he did not have the rich empirical data 
we have today. Lovett, supra note 9, at 853. Professor Shaviro briefly discussed reorganizations in 
his analysis of the efficiency benefits of realization, accepting the choice of Congress in this area; 
but, pointing to the same problems on which I elaborate here. Nevertheless, if we take his major 
points, we can see that the reorganization rules do not fare well. This is not surprising, since they are 
an (unjustified) exception to the potentially efficient realization rules. Of course, most of the data 
presented in this Article was not available to Professor Shaviro at the time he wrote his article—pre-
1992. See Shaviro, supra  note 19. 
 58. See, e.g ., Hellerstein, supra  note 9. 
 59. As did all Subchapter C of the IRC. See Clark, supra  note 16, at 92–93, (from whom I 
borrowed the above morphogenetic metaphor). 
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corporate control. Nevertheless, this simple picture has proven more 
complicated at second glance. Recent study shows that multiple factors 
affect M&A activity and motivations. Moreover, these factors are 
dynamic—they change as market circumstances change, making the 
analysis even more difficult since the perspective of time may be needed 
to even identify these factors. Neve rtheless, certain patterns can be 
identified, allowing me to reach the conclusion that the reorganization 
provisions cannot be a priori justified on efficiency grounds since they 
represent a group of transactions that is not identifiably more desirable 
than other M&A transactions. In fact, it may be less desirable. I also 
show that the reorganization rules do not play a decisive role even in the 
initiation of the transactions they are supposed to encourage, which 
makes them ineffective and wasteful even with respect to those 
transactions. I start this section with background that should provide 
some common ground for the discussion, followed by a reconstruction of 
the possible efficiency arguments supporting the reorganization 
provisions and an analysis of their validity in light of the external 
literature. 
A. Background 
1. Taxation and neutrality  
In order to effectively apply the wisdom of this external (nontax) 
literature to a tax discussion, I need to add some background notes on 
both our tax system and the external analysis of M&A transactions. I 
start with tax. It is a basic concept of tax law that its rules come into play 
only after the application of private law rules, primarily those of property 
and commercial law. For example, if I sell a picture that has appreciated 
in value since I bought it, I, as a taxpayer, should realize this increase in 
value (and recognize it) as a taxable gain, but this is true only if I were 
actually the owner of the picture and if the transaction I engaged in were 
actually a sale. This concept, although fundamental, is not cogent, since 
in certain cases the tax law deviates from private-law consequences. 
Such deviation may be justified by anti-avoidance reasons,60 as well as 
                                                 
 60. For example, a sale of certain intellectual property is not economically different from 
licensing it for a long (enough) term; but the tax consequences may be significantly different, 
especially at the international level where a withholding tax is imposed on royalty payments but not 
on sale proceeds. For this reason, taxpayers have tried to disguise licenses as sales contingent upon 
performance, profits, etc. One legislative answer has been § 881(a)(4), which taxes gains “flavored” 
with royalty features similar to royalties. 
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administrative convenience and political reasons. Any deviation must 
have a good reason, since it represents the exception rather than the rule. 
A logical fundamental tax policy concept that follows is the 
requirement that tax laws be neutral; they should perform their task of 
taxation without affecting (distorting) the business and investment 
decisions of taxpayers. Neutrality is a central characteristic of an 
efficient tax system,61 which performs its task to provide governments 
with funds they can use to finance public goods for their constituents. 
However, in our second-best world, no tax system can be completely 
neutral.62 Corporate taxation is, by definition, not neutral, since it taxes 
legal persons who do not bear the actual incidence of the tax. At the very 
basic level, the corporate tax provides a disincentive to invest and do 
business through corporations.63 The reorganization provisions are also 
not neutral.64 They provide an opposite incentive—to operate through 
corporations, since they represent a benefit that can only be enjoyed if 
one does just that. The benefit is, as already mentioned, tax-deferral 
treatment of certain transactions using (primarily) 65 stock as 
consideration, and only to the extent of that stock consideration. Simply 
put, the parameters most relevant in tax law to attain this benefit are that 
the transactions have primarily stock consideration, the benefit is given 
                                                 
 61. Neutrality and efficiency are not synonymous; nevertheless, since the tax system operates 
in an imperfect market, a nonneutral tax system may still be efficient, provided that it “corrects” 
market failures. This distinction is, however, mainly theoretical, since the whole analysis is 
effectively in a second-best world. 
 62. Lump-sum taxes are basically neutral but politically impossible, as proved by the classic 
example of the Thatcher Administration’s attempts to implement them in the United Kingdom in 
1990. For a good review, see HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE   282–87 (6th. ed. 2002). 
 63. This is not so simple, though, since different provisions of Subchapter C provide 
contradicting incentives. See Clark, supra  note 16.  
 64. The corporate tax itself is at the bottom of the issue, since it distorts incentives to do 
business and investments through corporate entities versus other entities, but this problem is beyond 
my scope. I assume here that the corporate tax is here to stay, and I will take it, therefore, as a given. 
Further, I do not intend here to evaluate whether they should be neutral, whether they are neutral 
enough, or other similar questions, which will be partly discussed below. For the effect of the 
reorganization provisions on M&A transactions, see, for example, James W. Wansley, William R. 
Lane, & Ho C. Yang, Abnormal Returns to Acquired Firms by Type of Acquisition and Method of 
Payment, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1983, at 16, 16–22 (observing significantly higher returns to target 
shareholders compensated mainly with cash, in comparison to those compensated mainly with stock, 
and concluding that these should be attributed to the tax effect). For a more detailed analysis, see 
Carla Hayn, Tax Attributes as Determinants of Shareholder Gains in Corporate Acquisitions, 23 J. 
FIN. ECON. 121 (1989). 
 65. Current rules allow mergers to qualify as reorganizations if at least forty percent of the 
consideration is in any type of stock. They demand one hundred percent voting stock consideration 
in the type “B” (stock-for-stock) reorganizations, and at least eighty percent voting stock 
consideration in the type “C” (assets-for-stock) reorganization. I.R.C. § 368(a)–(c).  
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art23
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE - BRA-PP2 1/22/2004 4:40  PM 
  
 119 
only to stock consideration, the transactions are founded on appropriate 
motives (only business reasons qualify as such), a significant part of the 
former shareholders maintain equity risk in the surviving entity, and a 
significant continuity of the old business, or its assets, is maintained. The 
deviation of these rules from neutrality should , therefore, have a 
convincing reason. I claim in this article that the reorganization law does 
not have any reason in general, and in this section I demonstrate that it 
could not be justified by efficiency in particular. 
2. The basic concerns of the external literature 
The external literature66 is more concerned with different features of 
M&A transactions than with the tax rules. It focuses on regulation, 
competition, and corporate governance. Therefore it primarily studies 
market power, efficiency, and internal agency problems. The most 
significant mutually relevant parameter between this literature and the 
concerns of tax law is the type of consideration used in the transaction. 
Other important issues studied by this literature are the phenomenon of 
M&A “waves,” defined by the increase in both number and volume of 
such transactions in modern times, the hostile  features of the transaction, 
and the classification of vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate 
transactions.67 The purpose of these studies is to better understand why 
corporations enter into M&A transactions and the social consequences of 
these transactions. They result in a weak understanding that M&A 
transactions are socially beneficial on average, i.e., creating wealth and 
not just redistributing it from one sector to another. This, however, does 
not fully explain the continuing motivations of corporations to enter this 
risky, and extremely costly, game. These motivations may vary and are 
not very clear or simple. 
It is common to divide M&A transactions into waves. The first 
M&A wave peaked at the turn of the century, creating, in predominantly 
horizontal combinations, some of the largest monopolies of our time.68 
The second wave, lasting from 1916 to 1929, practically continued this 
pattern, but since the antitrust environment of the period was stricter, it 
                                                 
 66. For example, the economic, business, and corporate law literature. 
 67. In a vertical merger the transaction is between entities that have a buyer-seller 
relationship. In a horizontal merger, the transaction is between competitors, and in a conglomerate 
merger it is between firms in unrelated businesses (i.e., they are not competitors and do not have a 
buyer-seller relationship of any kind). 
 68. PATRICK GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS  23 
(3d. ed. 2002). 
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consisted mainly of the consolidation of industries and resulted in 
oligopolistic rather than monopolistic structures.69 The next wave was 
delayed until the second part of the 1960s. During the four interim 
decades, antitrust legislation continued to tighten, and M&A activity was 
concentrated in smaller firms and, many times, had tax rather than 
business motivations.70 Asset acquisitions, in particular, thrived because 
they were not covered by the Clayton Act until 1950.71 This changed 
with the third wave, which introduced big conglomerates taking 
advantage of a booming economy and favorable tax and accounting 
treatments through, among other tactics, the increased use of stock as 
compensation to target shareholders.72 Today we know that 
conglomerates failed as a bus iness model and reduced social wealth 
rather than increasing it.73 The fourth wave, in the 1980s, was evidently 
the first to contribute to the efficiency of the market, presenting hostile 
takeovers to the business scene.74 It took place in a decade of large 
economic expansion, including some noticeable international 
involvement for the first time. This wave was characterized by the 
increased use of debt to finance M&A transactions. Takeover specialists 
dominated both tactical and strategic aspects of the market. After a mild 
recession, the 1990s brought about its own M&A wave, which in many 
aspects combined the third and fourth waves (however, the first two 
waves were considered anticompetitive and therefore existed in a 
substantially different legal and business environment).75 The typical 
fifth-wave M&A transaction was strategic (rather than financially 
opportunistic), increasingly using equity financing; it was less hostile 
                                                 
 69. Id. at 28. 
 70. Id. at 32. 
 71. The Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950 closed this loophole. See id. at 33. 
 72. Id. at 32-37 
 73. One explanation is that, currently, diversification at the corporate level is just too 
expansive. Nevertheless, ample evidence makes it doubtful there is any desirability for conglomerate 
transactions. Henry Servaes, The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave, 
51 J. FIN. 1201 (1996) (stating conglomerates were valued at a discount, on average, during the 
1960s third merger wave). Current literature on diversification in general provides interesting 
parallels in its findings that both industrial and global (geographical) diversifications are, on average, 
value destroying. Lance A. Nail, William L. Megginson & Carlos Maquieira, HowStock-swap 
Mergers Affect Shareholder (and Bondholder) Wealth: More Evidence of the Value of Corporate 
“Focus,” 11 J. APPLIED CORP . FIN. 95.(1998) (using a sample of pure stock mergers from 1963-
1996 and showing similar disappointing results to bondholders in conglomerates). See David J. 
Denis, Diane K. Denis, & Kevin Jost, Global Diversification, Industrial Diversification, and Firm 
Value (August 2001) (unpublished manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=244721).  
 74. GAUGHAN , supra note 68, at 44. 
 75. As does most of the external literature I review, I basically ignore these two first waves.  
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than the transactions of the 1980s and much more international in 
scope.76 In general, the typical fifth-wave M&A transaction seemed to be 
a more efficient, synergy-gains-driven wave of M&A transactions.77 The 
variety and constant evolution of these transactions may place in 
question our ability to correctly match tax rules that will correlate with 
the desirable features of M&A. 
Another important part of the external literature focuses on the 
distinction (ignored by the tax analysis of reorganizations) between 
hostile and friendly transactions following the 1980s fourth wave of 
M&A transactions. Hostility in a takeover bid has been attacked as 
threatening shareholders and management, forcing them to implement 
wasteful defensive mechanisms,78 and revered as the market mechanism 
to discipline and/or replace inefficient management.79 In reality, it is not 
easy to identify such hostility and use it as a meaningful feature, since 
most transactions contain elements of both hostile and friendly deals.80 
Moreover, recent evidence proves that hostility in takeover negotiations 
is most strongly related to strategic bargaining by the target and is 
significantly less related to management entrenchment.81 Therefore, the 
level of hostility changes over time and has no inherent distinguishable 
                                                 
 76. GAUGHAN , supra note 68, at 51–54. 
 77. Caution is due, nevertheless, since perspective and several other analytical tools may be 
required to comprehensively evaluate it. 
 78. Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence , in  KNIGHTS, 
RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 314 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 
1988). 
 79. Id. The classical article promoting this basic story of takeovers and their benefits is by 
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). 
 80. G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder? (April 1999) 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7085, available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7085). 
 81. Id. Interestingly, in spite of the dominance of the bargaining explanation to hostility, 
there is no strong and conclusive evidence on superiority of hostility in terms of the premiums 
received, even though this inconclusiveness seems to be due to the hardship of defining and 
identifying hostility. Id. at 20–25. See also  John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of 
the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 T EX. L. REV. 271 (2000) (confronting academia’s 
attack on poison pills with evidence that defenses were used not for management entrenchment 
purposes but rather for bargaining purposes, supporting the bargaining explanation to hostility). 
Coates developed the notion that it is enough to know that a poison pill could be adopted anytime for 
its effect to be felt (“shadow pill”), and explained that share prices do not fall upon the actual 
adoption of the pill. Rather, prices already have adjusted to the “shadow pill.” His Article 
emphasizes two major problems in the research of M&A transactions: the never-ending 
methodological debate, which casts doubt on the usefulness of any study in the field, and the 
multiplicity of relevant factors that makes the research so complex. 
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features.82 Hostility in a transaction is thus just another way to maximize 
the consideration to the target shareholders. One conclusion that may be 
drawn from this analysis is that hostility should have no distinguishable 
direct tax consequences, since it does not change the nature of the 
transaction, it is vaguely defined, and it is very hard to identify and 
quantify. On the other hand, there is evidence that hostility may impact 
the efficiency of transactions. A set of studies of hostile and friendly 
transactions concluded that these are two completely different processes 
that target “very different companies and hence should not be treated as 
examples of the same economic process.”83 Shleifer and Summers 
added: “[I]t would be a serious conceptual mistake to use the data on 
friendly acquisitions to interpret theories of hostile takeovers.”84 From 
my perspective, we do expect hostility to result in different types of 
consideration, since we do not expect stock to be very attractive in a 
hostile context. This expectation is somewhat supported by the 
evidence.85 Nevertheless, the low likelihood that only equity will be 
offered in a hostile context86 makes it harder and costlier for such a 
transaction to qualify as a reorganization. Reorganizations that 
completely disallow “boot” (payment in a form other than the stock of 
the bidding corporation) are the costliest and most improbable.87 In this 
Article I will not discuss this distinction separately but as part of the 
general discussion of the important distinction between cash and stock 
transactions. 
Another important distinction that has no tax consequences is that 
between vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate transactions. The tax law 
requires “a” business purpose, but is basically silent as to the type of 
business purpose required.88 Even the continuity-of-bus iness 
requirement does not necessarily mandate that the target’s business will 
be continued, since it suffices that the old business’s assets are used in 
                                                 
 82. In fact, in the 1990s takeovers tended to be less hostile. Joseph H. Flom, Mergers and 
Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 753, 761–62 (2000). 
 83. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 48 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).  See 
also  Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process, J. 
ECON. PERSP . Winter 1987; RANDALL MORCK ET AL ., Characteristics of Hostile and Friendly 
Takeover Targets, in  CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101 (Alan J. Auerbach 
ed., 1988). 
 84. Shleifer & Summers, supra  note 83, at 48. 
 85. Schwert, supra note 80, at 8. 
 86. Id. 
 87. That is the type B, stock-for-stock, reorganization. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). 
 88. BITTKER & EUSTICE , supra  note 8, ¶ 12.61[1]. 
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“a” business.89 One could expect different motivations for conglomerate 
and nonconglomerate transactions. The evidence has proven this idea to 
be true, presenting different efficiency benefits to these two categories of 
M&A transactions, which transactions are still ignored by tax law. This 
point may be moot in light of the current unpopularity of conglomerate 
transactions. 
3. Neutralizing the effect of taxation on current studies 
Finally, I attempt to normatively evaluate the tax rules applying to 
M&A transactions as if they had occurred in a completely neutral, 
unrealistic tax world. In the real world examined by the external 
literature, taxation affects M&A transactions in two ways: first, 
corporations engage in transactions because there are tax attributes 
(potential benefits) that may be better utilized by the combined 
corporation (tax synergy); and second, corporations engage in 
transactions because there are tax benefits to shareholders, i.e., tax 
deferral in certain transactions and circumstances through the 
reorganization provisions. It is important to distinguish between the two. 
In this Article I only examine, and question, the justification for the 
latter. The former plays a role in the motivation system for M&A 
transactions. I will refer to it and explain it together with the other 
factors, although I can say now that its role is not entirely clear to me at 
the present.90 The external literature assumes the tax regime of its time, 
including the reorganization provisions, as a given, and since my goal 
here is to normatively evaluate these, I try to neutralize their effect. 
B. Are M&A Transactions Efficient? 
The first prong of an efficiency justification for reorganizations must 
be that M&A transactions are in generally wealth-creating,91 socially 
                                                 
 89. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2001). 
 90. Hayn, supra  note 64 (providing evidence that tax attributes of the target are significant in 
explaining the abnormal returns to the target’s (and the acquiring corporation’s) shareholders, and 
suggesting that tax considerations do motivate acquisitions; in particular, successful “reorganization” 
increases the likelihood of completion of the transaction). Note that some of the studies in this field 
took place prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, 
when additional distortions between taxable transactions and reorganizations existed. 
 91. The bulk of the available studies shows that M&A transactions are, in general, wealth-
creating. Jensen, supra  note 78; Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and 
Regulation , 9 YALE J. REG. 119, 124 n.13 (1992); M. Jensen & D. Chew, US CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE : LESSONS FROM THE 1980S 6–7 (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, 
Organizations and Markets research paper No. 00-02 6-7, 1995). Current European studies show 
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desirable transactions in and of themselves.92 For our purposes, this is 
only the first step, since the reorganization provisions apply to (and 
benefit) only stock transactions. If we isolate stock transactions from the 
general M&A population, most (or all) of the social value of these 
transactions disappears.93 The results are worse for conglomerate 
transactions.94 These results are problematic to the efficiency-based 
justification of the reorganization provisions, since they supposedly 
encourage the less-efficient type of M&A transactions. Next, I elaborate 
on the efficiency properties of stock transactions (standing alone) in 
comparison with cash transactions, and conclude that they are not more 
desirable than cash transactions on efficiency grounds. 
                                                                                                             
basically similar results to U.S. studies. See M. Goergen & L. Renneboog, Shareholder Wealth 
Effects in Large European Takeover Bids (February 4, 2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author), and, specifically to the United Kingdom, S. GIRMA ET AL.,, MERGER ACTIVITY AND 
EXECUTIVE PAY (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3255, March 2002) (concentrating on executive pay 
and finding that shareholders had relative success in penalizing management engaged in mergers that 
did not create wealth to shareholders and were motivated by management interests). In Germany the 
market was just recently created as a result of deregulation. M. HOPNER & G. JACKSON, AN 
EMERGING MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL? THE MANNESMANN TAKEOVER AND GERMAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  (MPIfG Discussion Paper 00/4, (describing this process and concluding 
that currently efficiency effects of the process are questionable). Current surveys by KPMG: 
Unlocking Shareholder Value: The Keys to Success (1999) and World Class Transactions (2001) 
found, in the 1999 study, that eighty-three percent of mergers were unsuccessful in producing any 
business benefit as regards shareholder value. The 2001 study found this figure to be seventy 
percent. 
 92. Of course, theoretically it is possible that although M&A are inefficient pre-tax, the 
imposition of tax will make them efficient, but this construction is completely unreasonable in our 
context so I ignore it.  
 93. The specific motivations that drive these transactions may be irrelevant to this discussion, 
even if they result in wealth transfers between sectors of society (mainly shareholders to managers). 
Romano, supra note 91, at 124 n.15. This is, nevertheless, debatable, since one may argue that 
although motivations as such are not important to tax policy determination, redistribution effects are, 
especially when significant dollar amounts are involved. Jensen, supra  note 78, at 315–16, refers to 
an estimation by Paulus that target shareholders shared approximately $75 billion of $239 billion 
worth of M&A transactions in 1984 and 1985. For the purposes of this Article, I ignore the effects of 
redistribution, since it is unclear how significant these effects are and, in any case, these effects 
cannot support the current tax regime, but rather add fairness criticism to my other criticisms of this 
regime (assuming, very simply, that managers are, on average (no matter how one calculates it) 
much more wealthy than shareholders). 
 94. As the costs of diversification to individuals decrease, and capital markets expand and 
become more easily and cheaply accessible, it is less attractive to investors to use corporations to 
sufficiently diversify their portfolio. This way they avoid the nominal and agency costs, and other 
inefficiencies involved with doing it through (particularly) the conglomerate structure. 
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1. The importance of the method of payment  
A vast literature demonstrates that the method of payment plays a 
significant role in M&A transactions and affects their consequences. The 
extent, and sometimes even the existence, of their effect are not always 
clear. It is clear, however, that this literature cannot support a claim that 
stock transactions are superior to cash transactions.95 
M&A transactions result in a puzzling variety of consequences to the 
participants. Probably the least intuitive consequence is the relatively 
small returns to the acquiring corporation’s shareholders in comparison 
with the target shareholders. These returns are particularly small (and 
even nonexistent or negative according to some studies) in transactions 
using stock to compensate the target corporation or its shareholders.96 
With respect to the transactions as a whole, these studies have been fairly 
consistent in finding that cash M&A transactions generate value to 
shareholders on both sides of the transaction, and are, on average, both 
economically and statistically efficient. Stock transactions, on the other 
hand, have consistently been inferior to cash transactions. However, on 
average, they are still believed to create value to shareholders as a 
general group, although the target shareholders do not reap the bulk of 
this benefit.97 Stock transactions, therefore, have been found to generally 
                                                 
       95.   See, e.g., the studies mentioned in footnote 97, infra.     
 96. For a review of these studies see Kenneth J. Martin, The Method of Payment in 
Corporate Acquisitions,Investment Opportunities, and Management Ownership ,  51 J. FIN. 1227, 
1227–28 (1996). 
 97. See, for example, Jensen, supra note 78, at 335–26, partly referring to James W. Wansley 
et al., Gains to Bidder Firms in Cash and Securities Transactions, 22 FIN. REV. 403 (1987). See also 
Robert G. Hansen, A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and Acquisitions 60 J. 
BUS. 75. (1987); Nikolaos G. Travlos, Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding 
Firms’ Stock Returns 42 J. FIN. 943 (1987); Yen-Sheng Huang & Ralph A. Walkling, Target 
Abnormal Returns Associated with Acquisition Announcements, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 348 (1987) 
(Abnormal returns to target shareholders related to the form of payment, using a U.S. sample); Julian 
R. Franks, Robert Harris & Colin Mayer, Means of Payment in Takeovers: Results for the UK and 
US (1988). See www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP200.asp  (same results in the U.K.); B. Espen Eckbo & 
Herwig Langohr, Information Disclosure, Method of Payment, and Takeover Premiums, 24 J. FIN. 
ECON. 363 (1989) (similar results in France); B. Espen Eckbo et al., Asymmetric Info rmation and the 
Medium of Exchange in Takeovers: Theory and Tests, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 651 (1990) (similar results 
in Canada, including when checking mixes of cash and stock as compensation in takeovers). For a 
recent st udy confirming these results see ERWAN MORELLEC, THE DYNAMICS OF MERGER AND 
ACQUISITIONS (Simon School of Business Working Paper No. FR 01-11, 2002). See 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID281534_code010830590.pdf?abstractid=281534
Other studies show consistent results, except they find negative total returns in stock transactions.  
See, e.g., Servaes, supra note 73, at 414. But see Saeyoung Chang, Takeovers of Privately Held 
Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder Returns 53 J. FIN. 773 (1998). Chang finds different 
results—positive abnormal returns in stock offers (and none in cash offers) when the target is 
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be inferior to cash transactions from the perspective of wealth creation, 
or at least not to be superior to cash transactions. The inferiority of stock 
transactions is evident not only in studies of announcement-period 
returns, but also in studies of post-acquisition returns and poor operating 
performance after the transaction.98 Studies of transaction forms found 
similar results that demonstrated the superiority of tender offers over 
mergers. These results are logical since seldom will tender offers use 
stock, though it is becoming increasingly popular in mergers.99 The 
narrow way to interpret these results is to say that, although weak, the 
efficiency-based explanation of the reorganization rules withstands these 
results since it is still possible that without reorganizations these 
(although relatively minor) efficiency benefits will be lost. Another 
possible interpretation is that the bias embedded in the reorganization 
rules in favor of the use of stock in M&A transactions is inefficient, 
since, if anything, it encourages the less efficient stock transactions and 
(maybe) discourages the more efficient cash transactions. Moreover, 
studies to date do not separate transactions that benefit from the 
reorganization provisions from other taxable stock transactions. We do 
not know, therefore, if reorganizations are efficient in general. Such a 
conclusion cannot be deduced from the weak and disputable evidence 
that stock transactions are generally wealth-creating. Clear and direct 
evidence is not available, but its acquisition may be a worthwhile future 
project. 
                                                                                                             
privately held. However, a recent Australian study also sampling privately held targets finds 
different results from Chang consistent with the majority of studies of publicly traded targets 
mentioned above. Raymond Da Silva Rosa et al., The Equity Wealth Effects of Method of Payment in 
Takeover Bids for Privately Held Firms, Working paper (2001), available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID269212_code010510600.pdf?abstractid=269212. 
 98. Martin, supra note 96, at 1228. Nicholas F. Carline et al., THE INFLUENCE OF 
MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP ON THE REAL GAINS IN CO RPORATE MERGERS AND MARKET REVALUATION 
OF MERGER PARTNERS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  (Working paper (2002)). See 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID302606_code020321600.pdf?abstractid=302606 
(presenting similar data on a recent U.K. sample, but not when excess cash is involved). Then it is 
consistent with Jensen’s free cash flow theory. See infra  note 148. But see Randall Heron & Erik 
Lie, Operating Performance and the Method of Payment in Takeovers, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 137 (2002). They provide also a good summary of prior studies and demonstrate the 
methodological difficulties of constructing such a study. Id. at 137–139 .  
 99. Michael J. Fishman, Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in 
Acquisitions, 44 J. FIN. 41 (1989). Another distinction that is similar is the distinction between 
hostile and friendly transactions, since in the hostile setting the bidder is basically forced to use a 
tender offer and cash. These studies are related and their results correlate, so I do not devote separate 
discussions to them. See Huang & Walkling (1987), supra note 97, at 348, with respect to the 
relations between cash transactions, hostile bids and takeovers on one hand, and stock transactions, 
friendly bids and mergers on the other hand. 
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Why, then, is the use of stock increasingly popular in M&A 
transactions? There are many practical elements supporting the 
preference of stock payments. The first centers on funding concerns. A 
major obstacle to a cash transaction is obviously the need for cash,100 
which may be unavailable or very costly to raise quickly and in large 
volumes. Stock, on the other hand, has become a cheaper and scarcer 
currency in the past decades. Another reason for the preference given to 
stock transactions is that managers like to pay with stock, since it allows 
them increased flexibility in current and future investment 
opportunities.101 The evidence shows a strong correlation between stock 
payment in M&A transactions and greater investment opportunities for 
the acquiring firm,102 which, in contrast to most of the evidence 
presented in this Article, is not an undesirable aspect of stock 
transactions. Of course, it is hard to distinguish in this context between 
real opportunities and management opportunism, so the bottom line may 
not be positive regarding stock transactions after all. In other 
circumstances, cash transactions can be connected to management 
opportunism, the use of available cash for empire building rather than for 
distribution to the shareholders.103 The extent of such situations is not 
clear, but it adds to the demonstration of how complicated the subject 
matter is. Stock transactions may also be preferred from a public -
relations perspective, since it may be easier to “sell” a merger as a 
“merger of equals” rather than as a cash transaction that will look more 
like a “sale” of one corporation to the other.104 Target managers that also 
own stock in the target corporation like stock transactions because the 
managers are more likely to retain jobs in the surviving firm if they are 
also shareholders.105 
                                                 
 100. J. Fanto, Breaking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-
Mergers (May 22, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 101. Martin, supra note 96, at 1243. 
 102. Id. at 1228 (consistent with and referring to KOOYUL JUNG ET AL., INVESTMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES, MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, AND THE SECURITY ISSUE DECISION) (NBER Working 
paper 4907 1995).  http://papers.nber.org/tmp/43608-w4907.pdf 
 103. This is consistent with Jensen’s free cash flow theory. See infra  note 148. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Aloke Ghosh & William Ruland, Managerial Ownership, the Method of Payment for 
Acquisitions, and Executive Job Retention, 53 J. FIN. 785, 797 (1998). This is consistent with 
Martin, supra note 96, at 1228, 1244; see also  Yakov Amihud et al., Corporate Control and the 
Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 45 J. FIN. 603 (1990); René 
M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 20 J.  FIN. ECON. 25 (1988). 
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These explanations are insufficient to fully account for the extent of 
the use of stock in M&A transactions, however. As demonstrated in the 
next section, most of the literature concentrates on the effects of both 
incentives and signals to the market that result from information 
asymmetry with respect to the true value of either the target or the 
acquiring corporation in the M&A context on decisions regarding the 
method of payment.106 Hansen has developed the theory that the 
acquiring corporation has an incentive to pay the target with stock, 
because if the acquiring corporation overpays for the target, target 
shareholders now holding shares in the acquiring corporation will share 
some of that risk.107 Cash payments signal that the risk of overpayment 
is considered low or that the acquiring corporation is assigning a high 
value to the target.108 Another aspect of this theory is that high-value 
bidders, or bidders with private information that they are themselves 
undervalued, are more reluctant to use stock in an acquisition since they 
want to preserve the value potential of their stock for their own 
shareholders (assuming that there is an alignment of interests between 
management and shareholders).109 Information about possible synergies 
that may result from the merger is also in effect factored into the share 
price and may affect the negotiation over the method of payment used. 
This theory reinforces our discomfort with the current reorganization 
rules. These rules benefit only transactions that supposedly provide a bad 
signal that the management of the acquiring corporation is predicting a 
risk that it may overpay for the target in the transaction. On the other 
hand, they do not benefit transactions that provide a good signal of 
prosperity and high cash flow in the acquiring corporation.110 
Finally, of course, tax rules could be the reason for the use of stock 
in M&A transactions due to their preferential treatment of certain stock 
transactions. The importance of tax as a factor in M&A transactions 
                                                 
 106. This is consistent with the general theory about asymmetric information and stock 
issuance.  See, e.g., Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment 
Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984). 
 107. Hansen, supra note 97. 
 108. Fishman, supra  note 99. Fishman shows that this signal (cash offer) is also effective in 
deterring other bidders from competing with an acquiring corporation that offers cash in a bid. See 
also THOMAS FIELDS & THOMAS LYS, OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF THE CONSIDERATION IN MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS (working paper, 2000, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID239723_code000919510.pdf?abstractid=239723; 
See Martin note 96, supra, for support of the asymmetric information theory. 
 109. This is true even when mixed payments are made. Eckbo et al., supra note 97, found that 
higher valued bidders are more likely to use more cash in M&A. 
 110. Romano, supra note 91, at 123 n.11. 
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deserves a separate section, which follows, since it is at the heart of my 
argument and takes the analysis a step forward. Nevertheless, to 
complete my analysis in this section, I note that tax treatment cannot 
explain the full difference in value creation between cash and stock 
transactions.111 Tax does play a major role in a corporation’s decision to 
use stock rather than cash in a transaction. However, tax treatment is not 
such a driving force behind the decision to actually enter into a 
transaction, although some transactions are tax-driven and lack any 
additional business-related purpose.112 
In conclusion, I found no valid argument that supports the grant of 
tax benefits to stock transactions in particular.113 The reorganization 
rules apply solely to a certain group of (stock) transactions  (and only to 
the stock portion of such transactions) out of a heterogeneous complex of 
M&A transactions. Awkwardly, despite the complexity, variety, and 
evolving nature of M&A transactions, the literature is consistent that this 
“chosen” group is not superior to other M&A transactions from an 
efficiency perspective. Next, I demonstrate that from this perspective the 
reorganization rules are largely irrelevant even with respect to stock 
transactions. 
2. Do tax rules drive M&A transactions? 
From a business perspective, tax treatment has always been 
considered an important factor in the list of possible motives for M&A 
transactions. Although there is some evidence that tax benefits could 
affect primary decisions, such as whether to enter into an M&A 
transaction or not,114 this evidence is not very significant.115 
                                                 
 111. Franks, Harris & Mayer, supra note 97. In the U.K., prior to the introduction of the 
capital gains tax, similar results are evidenced. 
 112. We expect these latter transactions to be generally inefficient. 
 113. One unresolved situation is with respect to M&A transactions where stock is used due to 
lack of cash or the significant costs of using it.  
 114. Hayn, supra  note 64. This study examined a legal situation, prior to the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, which was very different from the present and allowed easier exploitation of 
reorganizations to achieve tax avoidance that is practically shut down at the present (See appendix, 
infra). Additionally, a major finding of Hayn was that successful “reorganization” increased the 
likelihood of completion of an M&A transaction. This finding may still be valid, but it does not 
make tax a primary explanation for the initiation of M&A transactions. 
 115. A. Auerbach & D. Reishus, The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions, in 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 69, 81 (1988). (Analysis of a comprehensive 1968–1983 sample found 
that tax reduction was not a significant motive for M&A transactions. Even when tax benefits had 
some value, it was far lower than the overall premiums). See also  Martin D. Ginsburg, Comment, in 
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 366 (John C. Coffee et al. 
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Tax benefits are significant, nevertheless, in the decision of how to 
execute an M&A transaction and particularly in the choice of payment 
methods.116 Once a decision to enter a specific transaction is made and 
the business fundamentals are agreed upon, the parties will try to 
minimize the tax implications. This typically leads to an attempt to 
qualify the transaction as a reorganization in order to take advantage of 
the tax deferral benefits of these rules.117 This also means that stock 
rather than cash will be used for payments.118 This observation, which is 
obvious to anyone involved in these transactions, is a very powerful 
criticism of the efficiency justification for reorganizations, since it 
exposes the fact that such transactions will be entered into with or  
without the tax subsidy that reorganizations represent.119 The subsidy 
embedded in the reorganization provisions is therefore ineffective at best. 
This is the next step in our analysis. It exposes the fact that even the 
narrow interpretation of the efficiency properties of stock transactions 
cannot support the preservation of the reorganization rules. That is true 
even if it were clear that reorganizations (standing alone) are wealth-
creating transactions, since they would have taken place (and created the 
same wealth) anyway. This is a classic case of an ineffective subsidy. 
The only transactions the rules possibly promote are the inherently 
inefficient, purely tax-driven transactions. The complexity price—large 
administrative, enforcement, and compliance costs—is therefore a pure 
                                                                                                             
eds. 1988). Romano further surveys later studies, none of which provide support for a general tax-
driven explanation for M&A transactions. See Romano, supra  note 91, at 135–36 . Moreover, the 
same results could be achieved using alternative techniques that are not inferior to reorganization 
preferences. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate Co ntrol: The 
Uncertain Case for Tax Motivated Acquisitions, in  KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF 
THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 271 (John C. Coffee et al. eds. 1988). But see Elliott J. Weiss, Comment, in 
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 360 (John C. Coffee et al. 
eds. 1988). Doubting the conclusiveness of the results of Gilson et. al., Weiss argued that in the real 
world, it is not so easy to achieve the tax benefits that one may achieve in M&A transactions in 
alternative ways, even if it is possible theoretically. Weiss rightly limits the strength of their 
argument but not its validity. He also does not argue that tax benefits are substantially driving M&A 
transactions. 
 116. This is well known. See Norris Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques in 
Corporate Acquisitions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1957). A recent study showed that the tax features 
of the acquiring corporation rather than those of the target corporation primarily affect the 
transaction’s structure. Merle Erickson, The Effect of Taxes on the Structure of Co rporate 
Acquisitions, 36(2) J. ACCT. RES. 279, 296 (1998). 
 117. Sometimes it will be deemed a reorganization in order not to attract shareholders’ 
resistance. Obviously, they will be less likely to resist or further inquire into the transaction if it does 
not result in their current taxation. 
 118.  See  Wansley et. al., supra note 64, at 19. 
 119. Therefore, these transactions cannot justify the subsidy. See Schizer, supra  note 23. 
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waste. The actual effect of the reorganization preferences is to provide a 
poorly designed, unfocused, and arbitrary subsidy to some participants in 
certain forms of M&A transactions. Who are these benefactors and what 
do they receive? This will be discussed in Part III.C, but first I discuss 
some additional possible efficiency aspects of reorganizations. 
3. Do reorganizations correct a market failure? 
Are there any other possible efficiency explanations for the 
reorganization provis ions? One explanation could be that they correct a 
market failure and optimize the amount and volume of such transactions. 
There is no clear answer as to whether the use of the market for corporate 
control is efficient, however. Nevertheless, some recent studies provide 
powerful evidence of the central role and comparative advantage of 
markets over management as efficient means of restructuring industries. 
Holmstrom and Kaplan, in particular, furthered the theory that capital 
markets are superior to the corporate governance structure (primarily 
management) in restructuring industries and allocating capital efficiently 
among industries required to restructure as a result of deregulation and 
technological changes (i.e., new information and communication 
technologies).120 Managers not only have misaligned motivations, but 
also cannot respond as quickly, effectively, or appropriately to 
changes.121 They conclude that a more market-oriented style of corporate 
governance is probably here to stay, with the focus on shareholder value, 
to which management has adapted and aligned its own interests (through 
the new executive pay schemes). Holmstrom and Kaplan’s prediction is 
realistically reserved, since they acknowledge that the market for 
corporate control is constantly changing and that some of the effects may 
be temporary. Moreover, they emphasize that M&A transactions, and 
M&A waves in particular, are caused by a complex combination of 
factors.122 
                                                 
 120. B. HOLMSTROM & S. KAPLAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MERGER ACTIVITY IN 
THE U.S.: MAKING SENSE OF THE 1980S AND 1990S 2, 23–24, 28–29 (MIT Department of 
Economics Working Paper  No. 01-11, February 2001). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID261112_code010221500.pdf?abstractid=261112 
 121. It is interesting to compare this academic theory to the comment by John Vogelstein, 
Comment, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARG ETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 358, 358– 
59  (John C. Coffee et al. eds. 1988), who, as a practitioner, explained that the pace of takeovers was 
very fast and the rational analysis in most transactions was either limited or nonexistent, and that he 
believed that excesses in takeovers were brought about by “speculation, ego, and greed.” 
 122. HOLMSTROM & KAPLAN, supra note 120, at 14. This insight seems trivial, but it should 
always be kept in mind when one is to engineer policy relating to M&A transactions. 
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There is ample evidence on market failures that may fit a theoretical 
“corrective” efficiency explanation like the one mentioned above. The 
problem is that there is no correlation between such potential market 
failures and the operation of the reorganization provisions. The opposite 
is true—these provisions are more likely to facilitate market 
inefficiencies rather than mitigate them. Information gaps, which allow 
management to abuse all other players in this market, represent probably 
the single most significant inefficiency potential. Selfish management 
maneuvers have proven to be a valid, though partial, explanation for 
M&A transactions. These maneuvers are also the only significant 
nonvalue-maximizing explanation.123 
C. Motives for and Explanations of M&A Transactions 
It should be clear at this point that the reorganization provis ions 
cannot be justified on efficiency grounds, but only a deeper look into 
M&A transactions will expose the actual complication of the efficiency 
analysis of these transactions and the inadequacy of their tax treatment. 
In this subpart, I review the evidence from external literature about M&A 
transactions and their efficiency properties. I discuss the major findings 
of this literature with respect to the validity of the theory regarding 
motives and explanations in M&A with a double purpose. First, I 
identify the benefactors from the reorganization provisions and 
determine whether the tax benefit they receive may be somehow 
justified. Second, I explore evidence that may be helpful in the next 
subpart, where I test the correlation between the current reorganization 
provisions and the efficiency properties of M&A transactions. 
                                                 
 123. This is probably the right place to clear two additional “noises” from the sy stem. First, 
some may say this whole discussion is moot since reorganizations are utilized largely in a related 
party, or even a single entity, context, so one should perhaps bifurcate the market further to analyze 
each distinguishable context separately. This may be a good idea for further study, but I have 
decided to focus here on the “mainstream” reorganizations, in order to make this essay 
understandable to non-tax adept readers. This analysis would not look different even if I did include 
all the relevant situations. However, I do not even have to prove this, since there is further evidence 
that the general efficiency of M&A in the long run is independent of whether the combined 
corporations are related or not. See Romano, infra , note 133. Second, as discussed already, the 
external literature provides evidence that tax benefits in general do not drive M&A transactions; the 
benefits of the reorganization provisions could not a fortiori be considered a major factor in the 
initiation of such transactions. 
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1. The market for corporate control 
The basic, naïve outlook on M&A transactions is that there is a 
market for corporate control that disciplines managers of corporations 
with the threat of a takeover and loss of status if they do not maximize 
their corporation’s share value.124 Managers, therefore, have an incentive 
to be effective and maximize shareholder wealth rather than serve their 
own interests. Nevertheless, the managers-shareholders agency problem 
is not fully solved by the market for corporate control since takeovers 
(especially if opposed by managers) are costly.125 Some studies even 
provide evidence that takeovers are, in fact, motivated by managers’ 
utility maximization and therefore “are the paradigmatic agency 
problem, not its cure.”126 Tension exists between the market-efficiency 
and agency-problem explanations to the corporate phenomenon. 
The standard view of M&A transactions has been challenged by 
extensive studies. Unfortunately , even today few conclusions have been 
drawn. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the empirical evidence is 
consistent with the premise that M&A transactions generally promote 
efficiency as wealth-creating transactions.127 These transactions generate 
abnormal gains for the target corporation’s shareholders.128 There is no 
decisive evidence showing consistent positive abnormal returns to the 
acquiring corporation’s shareholders after such a transaction. 129 This 
result may seem strange, since the acquiring corporation is supposedly 
the active initiator of the transaction. One explanation for this is simply 
that management enters M&A transactions with the purpose of 
maximizing its own utility rather than its shareholders’ wealth.130 
Another less skeptical explanation is that M&A transactions do have the 
purpose of shareholder wealth maximization, but for several reasons this 
purpose is not reflected in the share price right after the M&A 
announcement (in comparison with its pre-announcement price). Most of 
the economic  and business literature that explores the consequences of 
                                                 
 124. Manne, supra  note 79, at 11–13 . 
 125. FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 230 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993). 
 126. Id. at 230 (refering to Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial 
Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 241 (1993)). 
 127. This part heavily relies on the excellent review by Professor Roberta Romano, supra  note 
91, at 120. 
 128. This is more so the case in hostile takeovers. Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, 
The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence , 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983); Jensen, 
supra  note 78, at 314. 
 129. There is not even such evidence in the takeover context. Jensen, supra  note 78, at 314. 
 130. Romano, supra note 91, at 123, 145–52 . 
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M&A transactions consists of event studies of the immediate postmerger 
share-price changes. An alternative line of studies explores the long-term 
effects. These studies have found that the average takeover destroys 
corporate value in the long run. 131 Newer studies provide evidence of 
long-term performance improvement postmerger,132 consistent with the 
findings that M&A transactions are value-creating and socially 
beneficial. 133 These mixed results do not affect my analysis, since even 
under the more optimistic results, it does not seem currently possible to 
extract situations where M&A transactions are clearly desirable and 
pinpoint the circumstances for the conclusion of such transactions. If 
there were means to do that in a reliable manner, it might have been 
possible to explore the weaknesses of the reorganization preferences and 
possibly fix the rules to make them desirable. My conclusion, however, 
is that the current data does not allow us any insights that may encourage 
such a belief. 
2. Efficiency explanations for M&A transactions 
One set of explanations for M&A transactions assumes a value-
maximization motive behind the decision to enter into such transactions. 
Professor Romano, in an important work in this field, categorizes the 
various explanations of this kind into three types: efficiency, 
expropriation, and market inefficiency.134 In this Article, I follow her 
classifications. 
I begin with efficiency explanations for M&A transactions. The first, 
and most straightforward, efficiency explanation for M&A transactions 
is the hunt for synergy gains. Synergy gains are achieved if the value of 
the reorganized (combined) firm is greater than that of the reorganizing 
entities prior to the reorganization. One reason for this greater value may 
                                                 
 131. Sherry L. Jarrell, The Postmerger Performance of Corporate Takeovers (July 2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reviews this literature, referring to Jensen & Ruback, 
supra  note 128, and other studies from the 1980s). 
 132. Jarrell develops a methodology that compares the post -merger performance with the 
projected performance absent the merger. It finds that the long-term performance is significantly 
better than it would have been without the merger, justifying the perception of mergers as socially 
beneficial in general. Her results show impaired performance in the first one to two years post-
merger, and a significant improvement in the next four to six years. Jarrell’s study covered sample 
takeovers from the years 1973–1985. Id. 
 133. Romano, supra note 91, at 125 (referring to a former draft of Jarrell, supra  note 131). It is 
interesting to see that these findings are independent of whether the transaction is between related or 
diverse firms. Jarrell, supra note 131, at 28. This finding challenges the validity of the tax distinction 
between these types of transactions. See Part IV infra. 
 134. Romano, supra note 91, at 123. 
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be in more efficient operations (operational synergy).135 Recently, 
Maquieira et al.136 found significant net synergistic gains even in 
nonconglomerate forms of pure stock-for-stock mergers, reinforcing the 
reality that conglomerate mergers are not wealth creating. This increases 
doubts about theories predicting that financial synergies motivate some 
(primarily conglomerate) mergers.137 On the other hand, it strengthens 
the (currently weak) case for operating synergies in stock-for-stock 
transactions (usually predicted in a nonconglomerate form).138 An 
interesting aspect of this study is that it analyzed the effect of M&A 
transactions on a variety of securities and stakeholders and concluded 
that the wealth created in nonconglomerate stock-for-stock mergers was 
shared by almost all classes of securities holders.139 To the extent 
security holders can affect M&A activity, and with respect solely to 
                                                 
 135. This efficiency results from a better match of management to resources in the post -M&A 
firm. See id at 126 n.20. See also  Paolo Fulghieri & Laurie Simon Hodrick, Synergies and Internal 
Agency Conflicts: The Double-Edged Sword of Mergers (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, draft 
on file with author) (developed this explanation in their study of the effect of asset specificity on 
M&A activity). Another example of operational synergy gains are simply economies of scale. 
Romano, supra  note 91, at 126. The literature tracking the 1980s M&A transactions found larger 
returns in M & A transactions with firms in related businesses, and significant gains arose from the 
reallocation of assets of the acquired firms to related acquirers. Id. In addition, J. Wansley et al., 
Abnormal Returns from Merger Profiles, 18(2) J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 149, 160-61 
(1983), found abnormal returns in M&A involving corporations with similar financial profiles. 
 136. Carlos P. Maquieira et al., Wealth Creation versus Wealth Redistribution in Pure Stock-
for-Stock Mergers, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1998). The sample used in this study consisted of all publicly 
traded corporations involved in pure stock-for stock mergers between January 1963 and March 1996. 
 137. Id. at 6, 16–18, 29. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. Surprisingly, they found significant wealth increases to convertible bondholders in 
both forms, and convertible preferred stockholders in nonconglomerate mergers. Even more 
surprising is that often the acquiring corporation’s convertible bondholders benefit more than those 
of the target. Explanation of these findings awaits further study. A realistic observation may be that 
convertible bondholders of the bidding corporation enjoy favorable conversion terms, since they 
may include a large proportion of insiders and their “companions,” which generally suggests wealth 
redistribution motivations. Another study, by Hou et. al., using a sample from a similar period, 
though examining more than stock-for-stock transactions, similarly found overall positive net wealth 
creation effect of M & A transactions. KEWEI HOU ET AL ., DOES TAKEOVER INCREASE 
STOCKHOLDER VALUE? (EFA 0488 (2000). See 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID246151_code001101510.pdf?abstractid=246151 
They used a 1963–1995 sample and, similarly to Maquieira et. al., supra note 136, explored the 
overall effect on their sample as a “portfolio.” Additionally, they tried to combine short-term and 
long-term wealth creation results of mergers. They found little difference between vertical and 
horizontal transactions. Further they found that cash offers dramatically outperform stock offers, 
supporting, a la Hou et al., the management-disciplinary explanations of M&A transactions. 
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nonconglomerate transactions, this study does not present results that 
discard the efficiency justification for the reorganization provisions.140 
Another reason for the greater value found in the post-M&A firm 
may be financial synergy, which reduces the cost of capital to the firm. A 
reorganized firm should be able to more efficiently redeploy its cash 
internally across divisions.141 As a by-product, the tax motivation to 
retain earnings, rather than distribute them, encourages the firm to use 
(the larger) retained earnings to internally finance projects. This is 
significant because returns on internally financed projects are lower than 
the marginal cost of capital were the projects to be financed 
externally.142 Second, the reorganized corporation may be less exposed 
to bankruptcy, being potentially more diversified.143 Finally, there may 
also be tax and accounting benefits resulting from diversification. 144 
A second efficiency explanation for M&A transactions is that they 
reduce agency costs. This is the traditional, naïve view—that a firm with 
inefficient management will be exposed to takeover by another firm, 
whose (more efficient) management will increase the value of the target 
unrealized by the failing management prior to the takeover.145 This way, 
the market for corporate control keeps the capital market competitive.146 
                                                 
 140. I could not find support to another condition for this conclusion—that the tax (deferral) 
benefit plays any role in the decision-making process of security holders. I do not develop their role 
here, nor do I discuss the effects on shareholders who are also security holders. 
 141. Romano, supra note 91, at 128. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Diversification, nevertheless, is not necessarily a value-maximizing motive, nor has it 
proven to be, in general, a wealth creating strategy. Id. at 128, 146–48. The basic idea is that, apart 
from the special case of bank mergers, investors do not need M&A to diversify. They can diversify 
themselves in a less costly manner. Diversification as a motive became most important with the rise 
of conglomerates as a business model in the third M&A wave of the 1960s, which has proven a 
failure. Nevertheless, in some deals, these diversifying transactions resulted in notable successes, 
such as the GE story. See GAUGHAN, supra  note 68, at 123–33. 
 144. See, e.g., GAUGHAN, supra  note 68, at 154-158. The accounting benefits involved 
primarily the use of the pooling method of accounting, which has been limited over the years, and 
anyway, cannot represent a real efficiency gain, and is similar, in that, to tax-motivated M&A. See 
Romano, supra note 91, at 127. Studies showed, nevertheless, that the market could discern 
accounting gains from real economic gains, and, in reality, such accounting synergy gains do not 
motivate takeovers. Id. at 128 (referring, in footnote 28, to Hai Hong et al., Pooling v. Purchase: The 
Effects of Accounting for Mergers on Stock Prices, 53 ACCT. REV. 31 (1978)). New accounting rules 
eliminated pooling transactions at the end of 2000, but the data proves that, in fact, pooling 
transactions did not, generally result in higher accounting gains than purchase transactions. See 
Flom, supra  note 82, at 769–70. 
 145. Romano, supra note 91, at 129 (referring to the classical Manne, supra note 79). 
 146. Note that this rationale is not relevant to mergers, management-friendly acquisitions, or 
single-entity/single-group reorganizations.  
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Some studies support this outlook and even its application to nonhostile 
cases where efficiencies have been evidenced postmerger without 
indication of operation synergy gains, leading Romano to attribute them 
to better management.147 In any case, this explanation does not apply to 
cases in which the incumbent management is retained by the acquirer.148 
Finally, management-supported buyouts may also be explained by the 
mere fact that after the transaction management becomes a larger 
shareholder.149 
3. Expropriation explanations for M&A transactions 
The expropriation explanations assume that M&A transactions do 
not create new wealth, but rather redistribute wealth from one sector of 
the economy to another. Most of the discussion has been over whether 
they transfer wealth from shareholders to bondholders (or stakeholders in 
general) or vice versa.150 The most typical of these explanations 
concentrates on the potential tax benefits of takeovers, which I discuss 
separately below.151 A nontax explanation of this type focuses on 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs), claiming that they are designed to expropriate 
wealth from the corporation’s bondholders.152 This explanation, 
                                                 
 147. Romano, supra note 91, at 130. 
 148. Jensen provided an agency cost reduction explanation to takeovers even in these 
circumstances in his “free cash flow” theory. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, 
Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76(2) AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). Free cash flow is the excess 
of cash over the corporation’s need for projects generating positive net present value returns. 
Shareholders would like it to be distributed, but management’s interest is to retain it under their 
control. For various reasons management wants to expand the firm beyond the size that maximizes 
shareholders’ wealt h and stay away from the supervision of the capital markets. Takeovers eliminate 
such free cash flow, but keep the power of this cash in the hands of management in the form of the 
acquired target. Managers will do that even if the expected returns are low or negative, since their 
alternative is to distribute the cash and completely lose control over it. This theory explains also the 
high returns to target shareholders versus low returns to the acquiring corporation’s shareholders. 
Interestingly, if and when this theory applies, we expect cash to be the major, if not the sole, 
consideration. These transactions, therefore, should generally not benefit from tax advantages.  
 149. The buyout also has an obvious greater incentive to enhance productivity, blurring the 
agency problem by mixing in the interests of management as shareholders. See Romano, supra note 
91, at 133. This explanation has limited application—to management-supported buyouts only. 
 150. New research, nevertheless, widened the scope to include more specific groups, 
distinguishing between different stakeholders, to make the incentive picture even more convoluted. 
See Maquieira et al., supra  note 136. 
 151. See section III.B.2, supra . 
 152. A more leveraged corporation is a riskier investment, but the bondholders are typically 
not compensated for this change in their risk position in advance. In effect, such transactions 
redistribute wealth from the bondholders to the shareholders, Romano, supra note 91, at 136–37, 
and, potentially, to management. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE - BRA-PP2 1/22/2004 4:40  PM 
  
 138 
nevertheless, is not supported by sufficient convincing evidence—
bondholders’ losses were too small compared to shareholders’ gains in 
takeovers.153 A more interesting expropriation explanation focusing on 
(especially hostile) takeovers has been that they are designed to 
expropriate wealth from employees. The argument is that a takeover is an 
attractive event for shareholders, since it allows them to behave 
opportunistically and earn abnormal returns knowing that the bidder will 
have less commitment to the corporation’s employees.154 This 
explanation is not currently believed to be powerful enough to motivate 
takeovers, a fortiori other M&A transactions. Finally, it has been argued 
that M&A transactions increase market power and allow the combined 
corporation to attain greater (monopolistic) income from rents, 
expropriating wealth from consumers. This explanation related mainly to 
the first M&A waves and diminished as antitrust law developed.155 In 
many cases, M&A transactions involve unrelated businesses, where this 
explanation is even less relevant.156 In conclusion, expropriation 
explanations of M&A transactions are not convincingly supported by 
empirical study and are therefore generally irrelevant to my project. 
4. Market inefficiencies as a driver of M&A transactions 
Market inefficiency explanations assume unequal information in the 
market for corporate control, such as in situations where the buyer 
identifies an undervalued target (a corporation worth more than its 
aggregate stock value) and raids it by paying a premium to its 
                                                 
 153. Id at 137.  Moreover, LBOs were used mainly in the fourth M&A wave, but have 
declined in importance since, and seem not to be of further concern at the present. No new study 
provides evidence that changes the conclusion that this explanation is not a significant motive to 
enter M&A transactions. 
 154. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 83, have developed this “breach of trust” explanation, 
arguing that there is an implicit contract between the employees and their management and 
shareholders. This contract, a long-term commitment to the employees, cannot be easily breached. A 
takeover is one event where it could, since the bidder has no part in this contract. In that event, 
therefore, shareholders can “walk away” with (at least a share of) the value that this contract 
represent—a value that would have belonged, otherwise, to the employees, without any further 
consequences. This explanation was criticized both for the use of the “implicit contract” terminology 
and for its validity. Romano, supra note 91, at 139. For our purposes it is enough to mention two 
arguments: first, in cases where an explicit contract could have been used, the employees chose not 
to use it, and therefore, had always had the conscientious risk of forfeiture; second, it is hard to find 
persuasive identification of specific value that could have been subject to such a contract. There is 
no empirical evidence significantly supporting it either. Id. at 140–42. 
 155. Romano, supra note 91, at 142. 
 156. Additionally, there is no convincing empirical evidence supporting this explanation. 
Jensen, supra  note 78; see also  Romano, supra note 91, at 142–43. 
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shareholders. This premium has been proven to be lower than the real 
value of such stock. This straightforward, but unsupportable,157 version 
explains target undervaluation as due to simple mispricing. A more 
sophisticated explanation argues that investors overvalue short-term 
profits and undervalue long-term profits, and therefore firms that heavily 
invest in long-term planning and R&D are generally undervalued by the 
market and more exposed to takeovers.158 Managers who identify this 
phenomenon will also tend to behave inefficiently and shift resources 
from long-term projects to short-term projects.159 This myopic behavior 
is observed in the market, but not to the effect of initiating takeovers or 
other M&A transactions. Therefore these studies are also not relevant to 
my proposal. 160 
5. M&A transactions driven by management interests or incapabilities 
There is an important group of explanations that do not assume 
value-maximizing motives behind these transactions, but rather 
management-interest maximization. Managers seek to increase their 
power and wealth, a phenomenon commonly called empire-building.161 
This explanation is supported by several empirical studies,162 and at least 
is a partial factor behind M&A transactions.163 A similar explanation 
focuses on the risk, rather than the upside, to management. M&A 
transactions provide management with an opportunity to diversify their 
business; diversification may reduce the risk of bankruptcy, increase debt 
capacity, and reduce operational risks.164 Except for special cases,165 this 
is not very helpful or attractive to investors, who can diversify their 
                                                 
 157. A worthy line of future study could be to reevaluate this conclusion in light of the high-
tech frenzy of the late 1990s. 
 158. Romano, supra note 91, at 144. 
 159. Since this behavior was not found to be material in actually driving M&A transactions, 
and, even if it was found, I believe that it will not be realistic to base legal rules on such abstract 
myopic behavior, especially when we do not sufficiently underst and it and are not capable of 
measuring it. In a sense, this explanation is also an efficiency enhancing explanation and an 
expropriation explanation in that it redistributes (what is this unknown item that is redistributed?) 
from the future to the present. Id. at 144–45.  
 160. Even assuming if this phenomenon is real, we obviously do not want to support it with a 
tax subsidy. 
 161. Romano, supra note 91, at 148. 
 162. Id. at 148–49. 
 163. A variant of this explanation uses Jensen’s “free cash” theory, supra  note 148, which is 
partially supported by some studies. Romano, supra  note 91, at 149–50. 
 164. Romano, supra note 91, at 146. 
 165. Bank mergers are one example. See id . 
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holdings more cheaply at the portfolio level.166 Managers, whose eggs 
are in one basket (of the specific firm), may very well benefit from 
diversification at the corporation level, even at the expense of their 
shareholders.167 Diversification, in general, found little support as an 
important explanation for M&A transactions in the literature.168 
Richard Roll argued that although managers do try to make value-
maximizing acquisitions, they fail to correctly value their targets.169 
Therefore, they generally pay too much and refuse to admit their mistake 
even after the bid has commenced and share prices have fallen. Thus, 
takeovers result in wealth transfers from the acquiring corporation’s 
shareholders to the target’s shareholders. This hubris theory is only 
partially supported by empirical evidence and, at any rate, cannot 
completely explain the M&A phenomenon, since the evidence shows 
that takeovers result in efficiency gains, not only in wealth transfers.170 
Moreover, bidders should have learned from this experience, or at least 
should have been advised on it, and therefore this explanation may only 
have validity, if at all, in minor cases or with respect to first-time, ill-
advised bidders. In contrast, Shleifer and Vishny argue that management 
acts rationally, expecting, identifying, and reacting to stock-market 
inefficiencies that result in misvaluation of the stock involved in the 
transaction.171 
In a recent study, Rau and Vermaelen introduced an angle that 
further complicates the picture.172 They discovered differences between 
“glamour firms” (corporations with low book-to-market ratios—a 
positive measurement for management performance) and other firms. In 
support of the hypothesis that markets over-extrapolate the past 
performance of the bidder when assessing the value of acquis itions, the 
                                                 
 166. This is the case, as already demonstrated, in the shareholder’s point of view. Id.  
 167. Romano, supra note 91, at 147–48. Romano adds a value-maximizing variant to this 
explanation, stating that, possibly, the managers’ ability to diversify allows the shareholders to 
reduce their compensation, so both sides are better off. This efficiency “spin ,” nevertheless, is not 
supported empirically. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Managers may also fail to correctly evaluate their own ability to turn the failing 
acquisition around. Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 
(1986). 
 170. See Romano, supra  note 91, at 151–52; Wansley et al., supra  note 97, at 412. 
 171. A. SHLEIFER & R. VISHNY, STOCK MARKET DRIVEN ACQUISITIONS (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 8439, August 2001). See 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID278563_code011004600.pdf?abstractid=278563 
 172. P. Raghavendra Rau & Theo Vermaelen, Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition 
Performance of Acquiring Firms, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 223 (1998). 
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researchers found that glamour firms’ managers overestimate their 
abilities to manage a target corporation. They attribute this phenomenon 
to management hubris.173 On the other hand, the managers at “value 
firms” (those with bad past performance) are much more restricted by 
internal disciplinary means. The restrictions better assure that M&A 
transactions are motivated by shareholder value creation and not by 
management hubris. The conclusion is that the market fails to understand 
that past managerial performance is not a good indicator for future 
performance, at least in the case of acquisitions.174 This failure does 
explain why we identify short-term positive returns upon M&A 
transactions, followed by long-term underperformance. Nevertheless, not 
all of the glamour managers are interested in short-term gains, so the 
original puzzle is not solved. 175 The distinction between glamour and 
value firms, and the different processes they experience in M&A 
transactions, is also ignored by tax law, which is generally not sensitive 
to inefficient and socially undesirable “managerialism.” 
Management-related explanations are not convincingly supported by 
empirical studies. Nonetheless, transactions actually driven by such 
motivations are likely to be inefficient, since maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth is not in the interest of managers. For the same reason, these 
transactions are also most likely to be manipulated to maximize their tax 
benefits and are more likely to be stock rather than cash transactions. 
  
                                                 
 173. Id. at 225, 251. For Roll’s management hubris explanation, see supra note 169. 
 174. Rau & Vermaelen, supra note 172, at 251.  
 175. Another interesting distinction Rau and Vermaelen make is between mergers and tender 
offers, which are used interchangeably in some of the literature I survey here. They found 
significantly lower returns in mergers compared to tender offers, both in “glamour” and “value” 
firms. Id. at 227. For similar results see T. Loughran & A. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit 
From Corporate Acquisitions?  52 J. FIN. 1765, 1789 (1997). This finding is not new and can be 
easily associated with the other literature on the different returns of different means of payments, 
documenting consistently higher returns in cash payments than in stock transactions, which are more 
typical in mergers. The authors also add that many of their results are also consistent with the means 
of payment hypothesis just described. Id. See also  Wansley et al., supra note 97 (supporting the 
payment method signaling hypothesis). It is possible to argue that glamour firms time their (stock) 
payments with overvaluation of their firm’s stock. Rau & Vermaelen, supra  note 172, at 251. See 
also Loughran et. al., supra . An earlier study by Henri Servaes, Tobin’s Q and the Gains from 
Takeovers, 46 J. FIN. 409 (1991), found evidence showing that more value can be created from 
taking over poorly performing companies, consistent with the simple story of the market for 
corporate control. This is somewhat in contrast to Rau and Vermaelen, but the evidence relates to an 
earlier sample. Moreover, the validity of its methodology is questionable as well. 
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6.  The importance of deregulation 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford provide another perspective on 
M&A transactions, emphasizing the important role of industry shocks on 
the volume of M&A activity in the specific industry. 176 The 
identification of industry shocks as a factor in the evolution of merger 
waves has been recognized for some thirty years, but only recently have 
studies provided evidence successfully tying mergers to specific industry 
shocks.177 It is well known that mergers cluster not only in waves but 
also by industries. It is also apparent now that the various motives that 
have been proven relevant to M&A transactions are not always relevant. 
In particular, Andrade et al. provide evidence of one significant industry 
shock that has affected several industries—deregulation, which, they 
conclude, accounts for nearly half of M&A activity since the late 1980s 
(the fifth merger wave).178 Interestingly, the abnormal returns to target 
shareholders are consistent throughout the years in spite of the 
differences between the waves and industries involved. 
It is also clear that the shareholders of the acquiring corporation do 
not similarly benefit from participation in M&A transactions. It cannot 
be conclusively determined that they lose wealth in these transactions, 
but even if they benefit from them, the benefit is relatively small. 
Interestingly, Andrade et al. conclude that it is important to separate 
stock-financed M&A transactions from other transactions in order to 
accurately evaluate their effect, since these transactions inherently embed 
an equity issue that normally bids down the stock price.179 After this 
separation, they conclude that, in line with other studies that I have 
elaborated on, stock-financed mergers do not increase overall 
shareholder value in the short term. The long-term analysis, imprecise as 
it is,180 makes it even worse for stock-financed transactions, which suffer 
                                                 
 176. GREGOR ANDRADE ET AL., NEW EVIDENCE AND PERSPECTIVES ON MERGERS (Harvard 
Business School, Working Paper No. 01-070, January 2001). 
 177. See id. at 6, n.7. 
 178. In their words: “[W]e can say without exaggeration or hyperbole that in explaining the 
causes of mergers and acquisitions, the 1990s were the ‘decade of deregulation.’” Id. at 3 . I note that 
they used a 1973–1998 sample. One other current important article in the field of M&A also 
emphasizes the role of deregulation in the merger wave of the 1990s, together with new information 
and communication technologies. See HOLMSTROM & KAPLAN, supra note 120, at 2. Their empirical 
evidence corresponds to that of ANDRADE ET AL ., supra note 176. 
 179. ANDRADE ET AL ., supra note 176. 
 180. Id. at 12–13.  
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negative abnormal returns relative to cash-financed mergers.181 This 
study seriously challenges the efficiency of the tax subsidy that we grant 
to such stock transactions. An interesting question is whether we can 
apply the tax subsidy exclusively to restructuring industries where 
efficiency benefits and nontax motivations are more likely to drive M&A 
activity. Of course, even if we could, this would probably be an 
ineffective and still-ineffic ient subsidy since it is reasonable to argue that 
these transactions will most likely take place anyway. 
7.  The effect of asset specificity on M&A activity 
Another important factor in the initiation of M&A transactions, 
which has been explored in a recent study, is the degree of asset 
specificity in the involved firms or industries, i.e., the excess value of an 
asset in the relevant firm in comparison with its value in an alternative 
use.182 Fulghieri and Hodrick found that the performance of diversifying 
mergers improves as their degree of asset specificity increases.183 The 
intuition they prove is that in merging firms with a high degree of asset 
specificity there is a smalle r chance that internal battles will change 
operational assignments for the worse, generating negative internal 
agency effects that are more likely to occur in M&A transactions 
between firms with a low degree of asset specificity. Their findings 
prove that the positive synergy effects of mergers outweigh these 
potential negative internal agency effects if they are particularly large, or, 
when they are only moderate, in firms with high degrees of asset 
specificity. These results can be generalized and help explain the 
concentration of M&A activity by industries.184 
                                                 
 181. This is an interesting result; nevertheless, the methodological soundness and its 
importance are still in doubt. ANDRADE ET AL ., supra  note 176, reasonably chose to mention it 
without allowing it to affect their conclusions. 
 182. Fulghieri & Hodrick, supra  note 135. 
 183. Id. (citing consistency of their results with an earlier study by R. MORCK & B. YEUNG, 
WHY FIRMS DIVERSIFY : INTERNALIZATION VERSUS AGENCY BEHAVIOR (Working paper (1998)).  
 184. Fulghieri and Hodrick also predict that in mergers of corporations with high degrees of 
asset specificity equity financing is more likely than debt financing, since debt is an established 
mechanism to control internal agency costs (restriction and control over management), and this is 
less necessary in such cases where it is controlled by the asset composition of the merging firms. 
This prediction has, nevertheless, yet to be substantiated.  See Fulghieri & Hodrick, supra note 135. 
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8. Conclusion: the material motivations and explanations of M&A 
transactions 
The classic external literature185 supports mainly the synergy gains 
and the agency cost-reduction explanations of M&A transactions, 
partially complemented by some management-driven explanations.186 
No one explanation has sufficiently powerful empirical support or has 
been proven to apply equally to all transactions.187 Recent literature 
reinforces these results and adds insight on the importance of additional 
factors. The more important additional factors include industry shocks, in 
general, and deregulation in certain industries, in particular. Asset 
specificity is also helpful in explaining the concentration of M&A 
transactions by industries. This complexity and multiplicity of relevant 
factors exposes further the inadequacy of the stable, but crude and 
unsophisticated, tax rules that apply to these transactions. 
I now take the next step and review the lack of correlation between 
the major components of the current tax regime and the efficiency-
enhancing features of M&A transactions. 
D. No Correlation Between Tax Laws and the Efficiency Features of 
M&A  
A primary feature of the reorganization provisions is their 
application solely to stock compensation. My analysis up to this point 
demonstrated that the available economic and finance studies could not 
support an assertion that the transactions qualifying as reorganizations, 
standing alone, are wealth-creating overall. From an efficiency 
perspective, the pro-stock bias of these rules is, at best, questionable. In 
fact, tax distortions themselves contribute to the relative inefficiency of 
such transactions, especially when compared to all M&A transactions. 
Another interesting result of the above review is that the big winners in 
M&A transactions in general are the target shareholders, and, potentially, 
the managers involved in the transaction. The main effect of the 
reorganization preferences is to subsidize exactly the same population—
target shareholders—since they are the only ones that may defer current 
                                                 
 185. See Romano, supra  note 91, at 123–24, for additional theories that I chose to preclude 
from this review. 
 186. Id. at 152–53. 
 187. Id. 
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taxation. The necessity of this subsidy to target shareholders is 
questionable in this light, but beyond my scope here.188 
A second major feature of the reorganization preferences is the 
requirement of business continuity. This requirement is satisfied by the 
continuity of either the historical business or its assets.189 From a 
business perspective, these two alternative requirements are signif icantly 
different. The first may mean that intra-industry transactions may qualify 
as reorganizations, but it also means that vertical and conglomerate 
transactions are acceptable as long as the original business is maintained. 
From an efficiency standpoint, therefore, this requirement is not very 
useful. It may even be harmful, since it allows the currently undesirable 
conglomerate transactions and may discourage more efficient 
reallocations of business assets across industries. The other prong of this 
requirement mandates that the bulk of the historical business assets are 
transferred together, i.e., not necessarily each asset separately to its 
value-maximizing target. A relevant aspect explored in the literature is 
the importance of asset specificity as an indicator for potentially 
desirable M&A transactions.190 This finding relaxes the above-
mentioned effect of the second requirement, since in transactions 
involving firms with high levels of asset specificity this happens 
naturally. It is hard to weigh these conflicting potential effects without 
further study, but in general the business-continuity alternative 
requirements do not seem to make sense from an efficiency standpoint. 
The business-continuity requirement is written in a way that ignores 
much of the available business knowledge about the transactions to 
which it applies. For example, it ignores the distinctions found between 
different industry types and their importance in determining some of the 
economic consequences of these transactions. 
The third and historically most important reorganization requirement 
is that of target shareholder continuity, basically mandating that a 
substantial portion of the target shareholders are subjected to the risk of 
owning the acquiring corporation’s stock immediately after the 
transaction. This requirement only applies to the result immediately after 
the transaction; target shareholders can dispose of such stock shortly 
                                                 
 188. The subsidy raises fairness questions in addition to efficiency issues relating to 
managerialism and the wasteful costs-of-agency problems supposedly encouraged by these 
provisions. 
 189. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (as amended in 2001). 
 190. Fulghieri & Hodrick, supra  note 135. 
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after the transaction.191 However, they are subject to the price 
fluctuations of the acquiring corporation’s stock in the immediate short 
term. The effects of this requirement are interesting: it subjects the target 
shareholders, the clear winners of M&A transactions, to either negative 
or only slightly positive returns for at least a short period of time. Their 
enrichment is therefore mitigated and potentially replaced by tax deferral 
advantages. There is no requirement that target shareholders have any 
influence, much less control, in the surviving entity. A reorganization 
therefore has the potential to enhance, rather than reduce, the costs of 
agency problems within the participating firms in M&A transactions.192 
Otherwise, this central requirement has no efficiency-enhancing effects. 
The business purpose requirement does not necessarily target 
specific purposes. It rather requires a business purpose. From an 
efficiency perspective, motives are not important. They are, nevertheless, 
indirectly relevant, since management entrenchment and self-promotion 
likely result in inefficient consequences. This requirement is interesting 
since it at least has the potential to be utilized to promote certain 
transactions that we can identify as not inefficient and therefore mitigate 
some negative consequences of reorganizations.193 
We see therefore that there is no correlation between any of the 
major components of the reorganization rules and the efficiency 
properties of M&A transactions. 
IV. CONCLUSION—FULL TAXATION OF REORGANIZATIONS 
My analysis shows that neither of the possible justifications I 
extracted from the legislative history and policy debate could sufficiently 
and sensibly support our preferential reorganization tax regime. First, the 
reorganization regime, as an exception to the realization requirement, 
cannot be justified by the standard rationale for the prevalence of this 
requirement in our income tax system—valuation and liquidity concerns. 
Neither can it be supported on efficiency grounds, as I demonstrated in 
Part III, which is the primary contribution of this Article. Second, the 
                                                 
 191. For the minimum holding period requirement, see BITTKER & EUSTICE , supra  note 8, at ¶ 
12.21[5]. 
 192. This enhancement of problems occurs because reorganizations necessarily dilute 
ownership. 
 193. I would reject this possibility since it also has the potential to be politically abused to 
promote only inefficient transactions. Our politicians’ track record in adjusting the tax law to 
accomodate available economic evidence is poor, which is apparent from my discussion in this 
section and the multiplicity of the notorious “loopholes” in our tax system. 
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reorganization regime cannot be justified on the grounds that it is a 
desirable subsidy, or even a subsidy with some desirable properties, such 
as credibility.194 It is ineffective and counterproductive as a subsidy to 
transactions that would have taken place regardless of the subsidy. 
Moreover, it is a poorly directed subsidy with questionable fairness 
results. Third, although not directly discussed at length in this Article, 
this regime likely has undesirable fairness consequences that benefit the 
upper-class in our society.195 The conclusion is that the reorganization 
preferences are a costly and wasteful piece of legislation. The complexity 
of the rules and the constantly changing variety of M&A transactions 
(and explanations for them) illuminates how crude and untargeted these 
provisions are, even though they have remained intact for eighty years, 
completely detached from the market reality. 
In light of the lack of any substantively sensible reason to support the 
current reorganization regime, I am compelled to propose to completely 
eliminate it and tax all M&A transactions as they occur.196 I understand 
that this is a difficult proposition to most experienced tax professionals, 
who generally prefer a familiar villain over an unknown one. I 
understand this approach and can partially attribute to it the impressive 
stability of these rules in our system.197 However, I must reject it in this 
case, since taxing reorganizations is not a replacement, new, or unknown 
regime and since there is simply no clearly desirable feature in the 
current regime. The question is not of balance, since there is no material 
benefit in keeping the current regime rather than repealing it. 
Professor Shakow proposed to do away with this preferential scheme 
in 1990 with respect to all corporate acquisitions (not only 
                                                 
 194. Schizer, supra note 23. 
     195.   See, e.g ., Ip, supra  note 24. The fairness angle is also much wider and applies to 
incentives to capital income earners (mainly the rich) in general. See, for instance, David A. 
Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215 (2002); Michael L. Schler, Ten More 
Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possib le Solutions, And a Reply to Professor Weisbach , 55 
TAX L. REV. 325, 386, 388 (2002). 
 196. I do not attempt here to make a normative statement on other transactions, such as 
“internal reorganizations,” although I have included some data on such transactions, which does not 
always expose significant differences between those transactions and the acquisitive reorganizations 
dealt with in this Article. Interestingly, the Code deals with these transactions sporadically, through 
§ 368, as well as the consolidated returns rules. It is possible that the original purpose of 
reorganizations was to accommodate exactly these transactions, but they clearly did not evolve that 
way. 
 197. The other reason is political, namely, self-interest of all the decision-makers.  
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reorganizations)198 following an ALI proposal to make the 
reorganizations subsidy elective,199 adding that such action will require 
major changes in the tax law.200 The primary reason for his (and the 
ALI’s) proposal was simplicity. Shakow was concerned, for example, 
with the fact that even in a taxable merger only the shareholders of the 
disappearing entity may be taxed. The surviving entity’s shareholders are 
never taxed in a realization-based system. This may not be a serious path 
of tax avoidance in reality, but we do have fairly effective tools in the 
code to restrain it, such as those presented by Shakow himself. One such 
tool may be to always treat the larger entity as the surviving entity. This 
rule may be extended to reorganizations without significant costs.  
I agree with Shakow’s general approach, but in this Article I propose 
a more modest, limited, and less complicated proposal that does not 
require significant changes in our tax law. Reforming the taxation of all 
M&A transactions is complicated and, even under Shakow’s sensible 
proposal, involves certain material policy uncertainties and risks. The 
repeal of the reorganization provisions alone may not be a complete 
reform—it is just a first step—but it is an inherently risk-free, efficient 




                                                 
 198. David J. Shakow, Wither, “C”!, 45 TAX L. REV. 177 (1990). Another proposal, raised by 
Professor Coven, was to make all corporate acquisitions tax-free. Coven, supra note 10. Coven’s 
proposal aims at other distortions of our income tax system, like the realization requirement and 
corporate tax. I assume these two are unlikely to change. So long as these do not change, Coven’s 
proposal would result in a more distortive acquisition driven economy. See also Sh akow’s more 
specific criticism, supra note 198, at 208–12. 
 199. A.L.I.,  FED INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS pt. 2 (1982). See also  Shakow, supra note 198, at 178. Shakow 
rightfully criticized the “fatalistic” approach of the ALI, but acknowledged that not allowing the 
election must result in the major changes he proposes to the tax law. Id. at 179. 
 200. Shakow, supra  note 198, at 179, 193. 
 201. Shakow’s other major concern was the equalization of treatment of transactions involving 
partnerships. In this regard, I think that it is not necessary to equalize their treatment to that of 
corporations. Two corporations could, indeed, form a partnership, rather than a corporation, tax-free. 
They will not, nevertheless, avoid at least one level of corporate tax. They may avoid a second level 
of corporate tax, but that is not very disturbing since they could do that anyway under the current 
regime using a LLC, a “checked–the-box” entity, etc., or just by utilizing a dividend-received 
deduction. Id. at 205–06. 
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Appendix: History and Evolution202 
I. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND203 
The corporate income tax was the first enacted income tax in 
America.204 The Income Tax Act of 1894 attempted to tax corporate 
income, but was invalidated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Pollock 
v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co.205 on the ground that such tax was a direct 
tax on income from real estate and personal property, not apportioned 
among the states in proportion to population as required by Article I, 
Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution.206 Congress learned its lesson, 
and in 1909207 it successfully enacted a corporate income tax based on 
the business activity of corporations rather than on their property.208 This 
tax was validated just two years later by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Flint v. Stone Trace Co .209 The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment 
and the individual income tax followed in 1913. 
The basic foundations of the income tax treatment of corporate 
structural changes were established in the Revenue Act of 1918,210 
following earlier Treasury rulings that no taxable income resulted from 
the exchange of property or stock for stock.211 In addition to these 
rulings, the Act was instituted to settle the confusion created by several 
seminal cases on point, which took place prior to the 1918 Act. In Unites 
States v. Phellis,212 the Supreme Court denied nonrecognition to a 
transfer of assets from a New Jersey corporation to a Delaware 
corporation, based on the theory of “separation”—a severance of value 
from the original equity investment of something of value “for [the] 
separate use, benefit and disposal” of the taxpayer213—distinguishing it 
                                                 
 202. This section includes a historical review. It is intended to provide background for the 
reader with the tax Code . 
 203. For a more comprehensive historical review, see Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate 
Reorganizations: Purging Penelope’s Web, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1335 (1985). 
 204. This statement disregards the ancillary income tax that was enacted to fund the Civil War 
and was repealed in 1872. See http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=98142,00.html. 
 205. 158 U.S. 601 (1895), vacating 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
 206. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra  note 8, at ¶ 1.01 
 207. The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909(repealed 1913). 
 208. See BITTKER & EUSTICE , supra note 8, at ¶ 1.01. 
 209. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
 210. The Acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917 contained no such provisions.  
 211. RANDOLPH  E.  PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 8 (3d. ser. 1940). 
 212. 257 U.S. 156 (1921). 
 213. PAUL, supra  note 211, at 11 (emphasis omitted). 
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from Eisner v. Macomber.214 The court mentioned the fact that the new 
corporation had been organized in a different state, but in another 
decision it ignored this argument.215 A few years later it affirmed the 
rule,216 which has been settled ever since, that this fact is 
meaningless.217 Finally, in Weiss v. Stearn, the taxpayer won, and the 
Supreme Court applied its intuition that impos ition of tax requires 
something more than a mere change in technical ownership, allowing 
even some cashing out as long as that did not affect the nature of the 
unsold portion. 218 As asserted by Professor Paul: “It would be a 
masterpiece of understatement to call the net result of the[se] cases . . . 
far from satisfactory. . . . Logic was having a fling at the expense of 
practical values in a world of metaphysics. . . . The result was complete 
confusion.”219 Apparently, the courts failed to make coherent law in this 
case, and the legislature had to step in. It is doubtful, however, if that has 
changed things for the better.220 
This unclear legal background leading to the 1918 legislation was 
amplified by the high tax rates of that period, which created increased 
pressure by industry on the government to provide adequate guidance on 
the subject.221 The result was the enactment of Section 202(b), providing 
nonrecognition treatment for exchanges of property “in connection with 
the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation.”222 The 
rule adopted was that if a shareholder exchanges in connection with the 
                                                 
 214. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).  Eisner v. McComber is the leading case for nonrecognition 
treatment. In Eisner, the Supreme Court denied taxation upon the distribution of a stock dividend, 
which was held to be a mere capitalization of the profits of the distributing corporation, and not 
something that the shareholder had received out of the corporation’s assets for his separate use and 
benefit. 
 215. Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921), was decided similarly and on the same 
date as Phellis, but the sole difference in circumstances was that the new corporation had been 
organized in the same state. See PAUL, supra note 211, at 13. 
 216. The reasoning first appeared in a separate opinion in Marr v. U.S., 268 U.S. 536, 542 
(1925); see also PAUL, supra  note 211, at 13.  
 217. The insignificant nature of the state of organization was later codified into the type “F” 
reorganization. 
 218. 265 U.S. 242 (1924). See PAUL , supra note 211, at 15–16.  
 219. PAUL, supra  note 211, at 18. 
 220. As asserted by Posin, supra note 203, at 1347: “Since the Court had apparently dropped 
the ball, it seemed appropriate for Congress to step in and pick it up. Congress did so, but then 
proceeded to fumble it. In retrospect it might have been better to let the Court continue to grapple 
with the problem.”  
 221. Paul, supra note 211, at 9. 
 222. J. S. SEIDMAN , SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 
1938–1861 898 (1938). 
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reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation her stock or 
securities for other stock or securities “of no greater aggregate par or face 
value,” 223 such shareholder will have recognized no gain or loss on the 
exchange. The stock or securities she receives will be treated as taking 
the place of those exchanged. A property owner exchanging such 
property with stock or securities in a corporation to which she has 
transferred her property was also granted the same treatment. Any par or 
face value (not fair market value) received in excess of the stock, 
securities, or property exchanged was treated as gain. These situations 
are, basically, the “stock-for-stock” and “stock-for-property” 
reorganizations as we know them today. Merger and consolidation 
transactions were also covered in the “stock-for-property” rule.224 The 
legislative history indicates that such transactions were viewed at the 
time by the legislators as “purely paper transactions.”225 The Senate 
attempted to pass an even wider version of the nonrecognition treatment, 
but was stopped by the House.226 
The 1921 Act, enacted in a more accommodating political and 
economic environment, attempted to provide better and more elaborate 
guidance on the basic rules for determining gains and losses on corporate 
transactions. The relevant code section remained Section 202, though 
now Subsection 202(c) treated exchanges of properties. The new general 
gain-recognition rule also created a new term—“readily realizable 
market value.”227 Subsection 202(c)(2) was positioned as an exception to 
the rule’s general requirement that there be recognition of the gain or loss 
realized in a transaction228 if property received by a taxpayer in an 
exchange had such value. The exception applied if the exchange of 
                                                 
 223. Id. 
 224. No definition of a reorganization was legislated, and the legislation did not cover all of 
the situations raised in prior case law. A definition did appear later, in Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1567 (as 
amended in 1921). Interestingly, in Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937), the 
Commissioner argued that the 1918 Act had not exempted property-for-stock transaction (only 
stock-for-stock), in contrast to the regulation. The substantive argument was that merely formal 
changes are covered by the nonrecognition provision. The Supreme Court refused to look into the 
substance of this argument and accepted the Treasury Regulation as a correct interpretation of the 
statute. PAUL , supra note 206, at 19–21.  
 225. S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 5–6, reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at  899.   
 226. H. Rept. No. 65-1037, at 44–65, reprinted in  SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 899. 
 227. SEIDMAN supra note 222, at 789–90. 
 228. Practically, the wording of this rule reversed the presumption under prior law that every 
exchange of properties is taxed unless it falls in the exception. As a result, the presumption became 
no taxation unless there is a readily realizable market value to the property exchanged. The reversal 
of this presumption was a result of excessive uncertainty and litigation under prior law. See H.R. 
REP. NO. 67-350, at 10, reprinted in  SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 790. 
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property was part of a “reorganization.” A “reorganization,” therefore, 
was statutorily defined for the first time to include: a merger, a 
consolidation, a stock-for-stock acquisition, a stock-for-assets 
acquisition,229 a recapitalization, and a mere change in a corporation’s 
identity, form, or place of organization.230 Here we can see the 
establishment of the reorganization concept in a readily recognizable 
structure similar to Section 368 patterns.231 
Moreover, Subsection 202(c)(2) also added another basic pillar in 
our reorganizations tax law. The “substantially all” concept232 requires 
only a majority of both vote and value in the target corporation for the 
reorganization exception to apply. Prior to this law, supposedly, there 
was no leeway, and a transfer of all the stock of the target corporation 
was strictly required in order for taxpayers to realize the benefits of 
corporate nonrecognition. 233 The purpose of the new rule was to clarify 
the treatment of corporate structural changes and reduce litigation. These 
corporate changes were described as required business 
“readjustments”234—events that were, but should not be, considered 
realization events. The legislative history further refers to the gains 
realized in such events as technical gains,235 without actual cash 
                                                 
 229. The Senate Finance Committee Report adds, in this respect, that the assets reorganization 
was meant to cover transfer of productive assets used in a trade or business for like-kind property. 
Similar lines of thought may influence the current continuity of the business enterprise requirement. 
See S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 12, reprinted in  SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 789–90. Additionally, see 
the discussion in the Senate. SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 794. The discussion in the Senate added 
another conceptual requirement not yet formalized but familiar to us today—the business purpose 
requirement. See SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 795. 
 230. The last two, which we recognize today as type “E” and “F” reorganizations, were 
introduced in the 1921 Act for the first time. There were also some additional suggestions for 
transactions that should be added to the list  comprising this exception, but they were not included in 
the final act. Id. at 790–91.  
 231. These are basically today’s “A,” “B,” “C,” “E,” and “F” reorganizations, §§ 
368(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), (E), (F). 
         232.  Currently in IRC §368(a)(1)(C),  referring to properties transacted in the reorganization, 
for instance. 
 233. See also the discussion in the Senate. SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 793–97.  Interestingly, 
the same act added Subsection 202(c)(3), the predecessor of § 351, using the word “control” and 
mandating an eighty percent requirement rather than the more than fifty percent requirement. See 
SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 790. 
 234. See H.R. REP. NO. 67-350 at 10, reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 790. 
Interestingly, the committee also assumed that the new rule would increase revenue since it 
disallowed fictitious losses to taxpayers taking undesirable advantage of the nonrecognition 
treatment of Section 202. Id. See also S. REP. NO. 67-275 at 11–12, reprinted in  SEIDMAN, supra 
note 222, at 791. 
 235. S. REP. NO. 67-275 at 11–12, reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 791. 
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profit,236 and repeated the language referring to these transactions as 
paper transactions.237 Cashing out from an investment became, therefore, 
one of the tests for a real, in contrast to a technical, realization event. The 
discussion in the Senate additionally provided the first seeds of doubt in 
this context. The criticism of both the overbroad scope of the 
reorganization provisions,238 and of transactions that consist of shifts of 
risks,239 demonstrate that the intention was to exempt from tax not only 
technical transactions involving no actual changes in the structure of the 
relevant corporate body, but also transactions that were considered by the 
critics to be “more of a sale than an exchange.”240 Indeed, this leeway 
and the attendant fair-market-value basis241 in such like-kind exchanges 
opened the door to an extensive tax industry exploiting these 
provisions.242 This situation led to the Act of March 4, 1923, which 
amended Subsection 202(c) to limit the reach of nonrecognition to 
exchanges of stock and securities, but which, as a result, retained such 
treatment for mergers, consolidations, and reorganizations.243 
The 1924 Act was the next act addressing material changes in the 
reorganizations’ rules. It corrected the primary mistake of prior law by 
providing for exchange-basis treatment for property exchanged in a 
reorganization, rather than a fair market value basis,244 thus 
substantiating the tax deferral, rather than concession, theory behind such 
transactions. The act attempted to comprehensively rearrange and clarify 
the corporate reorganization tax regime, serving as “the nucleus of all 
later acts.”245 In doing so, it developed the reorganization provisions and 
brought us even closer to current law by: (1) replacing the “readily 
                                                 
 236. Id. 
 237. See the discussion in the Senate. SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 795. 
 238. The reorganization provisions also included transactions where only a mere fifty percent 
or more of control is retained in the “reorganized” corporation.  Subsection 202(c), reprinted in 
SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 789. 
 239. When one corporation owns property X and it is reorganized into another corporation 
owning property Y, the remaining shareholders of both corporations now share the risks in each of 
the two properties. 
 240. See the discussion in the Senate. SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 797. 
 241. Since no exception to the basic cost -basis rule was enacted with respect to 
reorganizations in 1921, see PAUL, supra  note 211, at 23–24, the oversight allowed a free step-up in 
basis and easy tax avoidance thereby frustrating the basic tax-deferral policy goal of these 
provisions. 
 242. H.R. REP. NO. 73-112 (1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 333. 
 243. H.R. RES. 13774, 67th Cong. § 1 (1923), reprinted in  SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 797. 
 244. I.R.C. § 204(a), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra  note 222, at 698. 
 245. PAUL, supra  note 211, at 24. 
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realizable market value” equation with the known “amount realized” 
concept;246 (2) providing, in Subsection 203(a), that, subject to the 
exceptions, the entire amount realized be recognized;247 (3) retaining the 
exception for reorganizations, but adding requirements that the relevant 
taxpayers must be “part[ies] to [the] reorganization” and that the 
transaction must be “in pursuance of the plan of reorganization”;248 and 
(4) clarifying that nonrecognition also applies to corporations exchanging 
property for stock or securities in another corporation where both are 
parties to the reorganization of one.249 The “reorganization” definition 
moved to Subsection 203(h) and added the type “D” reorganization, 
involving one corporation’s transfer of assets to another corporation 
where such transferee corporation is controlled by the transferor or its 
shareholders immediately after the transaction.250 
The congressional discussion evidenced very interesting and harsh 
criticism of the rules corrected in 1924:  
 There is no more frequent or common course of evasion at the 
present time than the provisions of the present law with reference to 
reorganization of corporations. They are so extremely broad and so 
loose that you could drive a four-horse team through them, and any 
good corporation lawyer can provide a method of reorganization by 
which, if a company has a large amount of cash on hand, it could be 
distributed without any tax . . . and . . . evade to a large measure not 
only the corporation tax, but in a great many instances the personal 
income tax. 251  
Nevertheless, the Revenue Acts of 1928 and 1932252 basically embedded 
these same rules in Sections 112 and 113. 
                                                 
 246. I.R.C. § 202(c), reprinted in  SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 686–87. 
 247. Id. at 687. 
 248. I.R.C. §§ 203(b)(2)–(3), 203(c)–(h). Id., at 689–97. Interestingly, not until 1937 did the 
Supreme Court provide some guidance about what a “party to the reorganization” means. The Court 
interpreted this requirement narrowly and eliminated some “natural” reorganization candidates in the 
famous leading cases of Groman v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 82 (1937), and Helvering v. Bashford, 302 
U.S. 454 (1938). The Groman-Bashford  doctrine was partially repealed by the 1954 Code, which 
provided guidance based on a more liberal interpretation. Later amendments expanded this repeal: in 
the 1964 Act, to type “B” reorganizations; in the 1968 and 1970 Acts to forward and reverse 
triangular mergers, respectively; and, in the 1980 Act, to bankruptcy reorganizations.  A cite is 
needed here. 
 249. I.R.C. § 203(b)(3), reprinted in  SEIDMAN, supra  note 222, at 690. 
 250. I.R.C. § 203(h)(1)(B), reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra  note 222, at  697. 
 251. 65 CONG. REC. 2,429, reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 697–98.  
 252. The 1932 Act did reduce the threshold for exchanged basis treatment in Subsection 
113(a)(7) to fifty percent.  I.R.C. § 113(a)(7), reprinted in  SEIDMAN supra  note 222, at 454.  
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In 1933, a special Ways and Means Subcommittee recommended 
that the nonrecognition provisions relating to reorganizations be 
abolished. 253 The reasons for the recommendation were twofold—
closing “one of the most prevalent methods of tax avoidance,” and 
“simplify[ing] the income tax law.”254 Nevertheless, as usual in the case 
of substantial tax reforms, timing was crucial. The Ways and Means 
Committee rejected the report, basing its decision on the economic 
realities of the time.255 The Committee concluded that the abolition of 
the exchange and reorganization provisions might result in a revenue 
loss, and that, in any case, most reorganizations showed a loss at the 
time.256 It concluded, therefore, that “the wiser policy is to amend the 
provisions drastically to stop the known cases of tax avoidance, rather 
than to eliminate the sections completely.”257 The committee referred to 
the courts as safeguards of the “right” policy. This decision doomed the 
reorganization rules to live on as the convoluted and complex regime we 
have today. Legislators have consistently chosen to add patches of anti-
avoidance rules rather than re-evaluate the regime itself. 
The Revenue Act of 1934258 limited the definition of a 
reorganization in Subsection 112(g) to what we know today as types 
“A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” “E,” and “F” reorganizations, allegedly establishing 
a closer connection to corporate law by insisting on a statutory merger 
and at least eighty percent control. 259 The Act also added the “solely for 
                                                                                                             
Additionally, Subsection 112(k) was introduced to eliminate tax avoidance through transfers to 
foreign corporations.  I.R.C. § 112(k), reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 452. 
 253. H.R. REP. NO. 73-112 (1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 332. The 
subcommittee added the acknowledgement that, in special cases, exchanges of stock, for instance, 
may result in undue hardship on the taxpayers to pay the tax currently, since no actual cash was 
received by them upon the exchange. In these special cases, the subcommittee recommended that the 
Treasury be granted authority to extend the. time for payment up to two years. The background for 
this report had been the failure of the legislation to implement the alleged policy in the area of 
corporate reorganizations. As Paul stated: “Elaborately drawn provisions were found to be 
inadequate and ambiguous, and to the extent that they were clear, they were exploited to the limit by 
diligent tax avoiders.” PAUL , supra note 211, at 37.  For more critique, see supra  Part II. B. 
 254. H.R.  REP. NO. 73-112 (1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra  note 222, at 332. 
 255. H.R. REP. NO. 73-704 (1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra  note 222, at 338. 
 256. Id at 338–39. 
 257. Id at 338 . 
 258. The Revenue Act of 1938, and the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, wit hout much change 
to the Revenue Act of 1934, also limited this definition. 
 259. This change upgraded the previous requirement from a simple “majority” to one of eighty 
percent. SEIDMAN, supra  note 222, at 341–42. The Revenue Act of 1936 amended Subsection 112(h) 
in clarification of the “control” definition to at least eighty percent of the “total combined voting 
power,” rather than just the “voting stock,” supposedly not changing the law by doing so. Id. at 243; 
80 CONG. REC. 8,799, reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra not 222, at 243. 
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all or part of its voting stock” requirement to the type “B” and type “C” 
reorganizations.260 The substituted basis rule was enforced in Subsection 
113(a)(6).261 The type “G” bankruptcy reorganization was added later 
and was subjected to the “reorganization” definition by the Revenue Act 
of 1943, completing the set of reorganizations presently in use.262 
The 1930s brought an additional layer of rules to the taxation of 
corporate reorganizations. Another wave of important cases established 
judicial doctrines, requiring taxpayers to satisfy some additional extra-
statutory principles. The first doctrine was the “Business Purpose” 
requirement. In the seminal case of Gregory v. Helvering,263 the 
Supreme Court required, in addition to compliance with the language of 
the statute, that a transaction must also serve a “business or corporate 
purpose” in order to claim “reorganization” treatment. This requirement 
has long been embodied in the applicable regulations 264 and has since 
been consistently followed by the courts and the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
The second judicial doctrine, the “Continuity of Business Enterprise” 
(COBE),265 requires that enough of the target corporation’s business 
must be carried on by the acquiring corporation. This doctrine has also 
been incorporated into the regulations and has been followed, although 
somewhat inconsistently.266 The COBE requirement emphasizes the 
policy that the reorganization of a business should not trigger recognition 
and current taxation of income because of a mere formal change in the 
corporate structure, so long as the business itself (and its value) remains 
essentially unchanged. 
                                                 
 260. SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 341–42. 
 261. SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 346. 
 262. Section 121(a) of the 1943 Act added Section 112(b)(10) to the I.R.C. J.S. SEIDMAN, 
SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS T AX LAWS: 1953–
1939, at 1551–52 (1953).  In this Article I do not generally refer to this type “G” reorganization, for 
simplicity. 
 263. 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
 264. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)–(c) (as amended in 2001). 
 265. This doctrine has been applied unevenly throughout the years—almost abandoned for 
some time and reemerged lately in a final regulations form. See John T. Sapienza, Tax 
Considerations in Corporate Reorganizations and Mergers, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 765, 782 (1965–66). 
 266. Compare, Rev. Rul. 56-330, 1956-2 C.B. 204, at 205–06 (asserting that the purpose of 
the reorganization provisions is to exempt from the general recognition rule certain specified 
exchanges incidental to readjustments of corporate structures, and only readjustments of continuing 
interests in property under modified corporate forms, and declaring that this was an established 
policy of the IRS), with. Rev. Rul. 63-29, 1963-1 C.B. 77 (directly revoking Rev. Rul. 56-330). 
Currently, the doctrine is reinforced in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (as amended 2001). 
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The third, and probably most influential doctrine, is the “Continuity 
of Shareholder (Proprietary) Interest” (COSI). It complements COBE, 
from the perspective of the shareholders’ proprietary interests, in 
supporting the same policy that recognition of income and its current 
taxation should not be triggered due to mere formal changes in the 
corporate structure of an investment. In particular, this should not be the 
case where the same investors hold the same investment, with no 
changes to the nature of that investment. The purpose of this requirement 
has been to distinguish “sales,” disguised in the statutory language of the 
reorganization provisions, from bona fide transactions, serving merely as 
readjustments to the corporate form of the investment.267 
In addition to these three requirements, the courts have applied 
several other judicial techniques in the interpretation of the corporate 
reorganization provisions. The most quoted is the “Step-Transaction” 
doctrine,268 an extension of the substance-over-form idea, which is the 
actual conceptual basis for the reorganization rules themselves—
nonrecognition allowed to formal changes that do not amount to 
substantive changes justifying recognition and current taxation of 
income. 
The 1939 Act (and Internal Revenue Code) added the rule that, in 
general, assumption of liabilities, or receipt of an asset subject to a 
liability in a reorganization, should not be considered as an income-
recognition event.269 The rationale of this amendment follows that of the 
general nonrecognition rules for reorganizations, that no “real” (or 
enough) realization has occurred, that taxation will cause undue hardship 
on taxpayers since they received no cash in the transaction, and, oddly, 
that it is the taxpayers’ expectations that there will be no recognition 
involved in these transactions.270 Interestingly, the legislative history 
                                                 
 267. Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 
(1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm’r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. 
Comm’r, 60 F.2d. 937 (2d Cir. 1932). The requirement was incorporated in the regulations, first in 
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.112(g) (1940). See PAUL, supra note 211, at 92 n.303. Presently it is in Treas. 
Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended 2001). 
 268. Bassick v. Comm’r, 85 F.2d. 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1936), American Bantam Car Co. v. 
Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff’d per curiam , 177 F.2d. 513 (3d. Cir. 1949). 
 269. I.R.C. §§ 213 (a), (c), amending  §§ 112(b)(5), (k).  See SEIDMAN , supra note 262, at 
1539, 1593. The change was made in view of the U.S. v. Hendler 303 U.S. 564 (1938), which was 
interpreted to the effect of current recognition of gain in a reorganization to the extent of the 
assumption of liabilities involved; the Ways and Means Committee assumed that Hendler nullified 
the reorganization provisions.  H.R. REP. NO. 76-855 76-855, reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra note 262, 
at 1593. 
 270. H.R.  REP NO. 76- 855 (1954), reprinted in  SEIDMAN, supra  note 262, at 1539–40. 
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indicates that the House was concerned about restructuring the 
reorganization provisions based on “uniform equitable rules,” 
emphasizing the primacy of the concept that no recognition is required in 
corporate non-cash-out transactions.271 Fairness, rather than efficiency or 
administrative ease, seemed to be the rhetorical engine behind the 1939 
legislature.272 
The 1951 Act formally reintroduced spin-off transactions to the list 
of potential candidates for nonrecognition.273 The legislators thought that 
impeding such transactions (by not allowing them nonrecognition 
treatment) would be economically unsound, deviating from the 
traditional fairness-based language to a more efficiency-based 
rationalization.274 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 basically 
rearranged the statutory scheme to the format we face today, presenting 
in Subsection 368(a) a conclusive definition of six types of transactions 
that qualify as reorganizations, namely types “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” “E,” 
and “F” reorganizations. Subsections 354(a) and 361(a) provided the 
operative rules of nonrecognition to the shareholders and corporations, 
respectively, party to the reorganization.275 The code also relaxed the 
requirements of the type “C” reorganization, allowing for twenty percent 
“boot” leeway, similar to current law.276 Importantly, this code enacted 
the elaborate provisions and limitations for tax attribute carryover.277 
Interestingly, the Ways and Means Committee had proposed to 
distinguish between publicly traded and closely held corporations, 
arguing that the former, having more separate existence than the latter, 
do not tend to engage in reorganizations merely to secure tax advantages 
for their shareholders.278 This proposal, even though it came from an 
                                                 
 271. Id. 
 272. The trigger for the legislation was, of course, the Hendler case. See supra note 267. 
 273. Originally permitted to be accomplished tax-free by the Revenue Act of 1924, they were 
repealed by the Revenue Act of 1934.  Section 317(a) of the 1951 Act introduced I.R.C. § 
112(6)(11).  See SEIDMAN , supra note 262, at 1555–56.  Congress feared that Mrs. Gregory might 
win her case, as she did at the Board of Tax Appeals (now the U.S. Tax Court). Evelyn F. Gregory, 
27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932). See Bittker &Eustice (4th ed., 1979), ¶ 13.02-13.03.  
 274. S. REP. NO. 82- 781, reprinted in  SEIDMAN, supra note 262, at 1556. The spin -off 
provisions are technically beyond the scope of this Article, but I chose to include it here, as it was 
part of the same body of legislation as the reorganization provisions, it was conditioned on a “good” 
reorganization, and it indicates of the mindset and rationale of the legislature. 
 275. Including the basic repeal of the Groman-Bashford  narrow interpretation of “a party to 
the reorganization,” to allow for an acquiring corporation to transfer stock of its parent in the 
reorganization. See H.R.  REP. NO. 83-1227, at  40 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 52 (1954). 
 276. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 52 (1954). 
 277. The then, and current, §§ 381, 382. 
 278. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1227, at 39. 
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anti-avoidance background, attempted to create, through a semiformal 
test, a more substantive rule . The Senate, however, rejected the 
proposal.279 
The 1954 code also added Subsection 368(a)(2)(C), allowing use of 
parent stock in type “C” reorganizations and permitting a drop down 
(contribution) of assets acquired in a Type “C” reorganization to a 
controlled subsidiary immediately after the original exchange (the receipt 
of these assets for stock of the exchanging (parent) corporation) without 
gain recognition. This was the first “triangular reorganization” provision, 
followed by extension of this treatment to Type “B” reorganizations in 
1964; the addition of Subsection 368(a)(2)(D), addressing forward 
triangular mergers, in 1968; and the addition of Subsection 368(a)(2)E), 
addressing the reverse triangular merger, in 1971. These additions 
intentionally expanded the scope of nonrecognition to transactions 
economically similar to other reorganizations, providing corporate 
groups with further flexibility and easier paths to circumvent the original 
limitations on the nonrecognition tax benefit.280 
In the 1970s, legislators further developed anti-abuse rules aimed at 
denying deductions for artificial losses realized by investment 
companies,281 again stressing their intention to allow tax benefits relating 
to reorganizations only in certain situations, and only when active 
business is involved. In 1980, the type “G” bankruptcy reorganization 
was enacted.282 This decade also saw other slight modif ications to the 
scope of certain reorganizations and their application to special 
entities.283 In the 1990s, most of the legislative activity surrounded 
divisive reorganizations, which are beyond my scope here. Throughout 
this period no explicit discussion of the policy behind the reorganization 
provisions is evident. 
                                                 
 279. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 51.   
 280. These rules allow, for example, a foreign corporation to acquire, tax-free, a domestic 
corporation, by organizing a domestic subsidiary that actually affects the acquisition/merger. The 
consideration to the target shareholder remains the stock of the parent, i.e., the foreign company. 
 281. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat . 1520; Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763. 
 282. Bankruptcy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389, clarified in  Technical 
Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365. This reorganization type is, of course, 
beyond my scope. 
 283. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 
3342; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494; Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, 96 Stat. 324. 
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The important Tax Reform Act of 1986 did add a significant new 
piece to the puzzle, although indirectly, with the abolishment of the 
“General Utilities” doctrine. This doctrine had allowed taxpayers, in 
certain cases, to make the tax deferral in M&A transactions permanent, 
avoiding at least one level of corporate tax. The 1986 Act generally 
confined the application of tax-free reorganizations to pure tax-deferral 
transactions, barring an easy path to tax avoidance and preserving the 
integrity of the carried-over asset basis as the price for such deferral. 
It is evident that the reorganization provisions and their benefits are 
intended to apply only to transactions where either the core ownership 
group or the core business, or both, remain substantially the same except 
for a formal change justified by business reasons. This is also the basic 
rationale behind their legislation, as apparent from the famous Bazley 
quote.284 This justification, originally supported by perceptions of 
fairness, is the cornerstone for allowing reorganizations to maintain their 
role as necessary exceptions to the fundamental (though vague and, 
sometimes, unsatisfactory) realization basis of our income tax system. In 
the background, one can extract an intuition that reorganizations are also 
justified by efficiency reasons, since they allow businesses flexibility 
without prohibitive tax costs to mere technical changes. This scheme has 
not been effectively challenged over the years. In the next section, I 
elaborate on some of the more serious critique attempts. 
II. MAJOR HISTORICAL CRITIQUES OF THE REORGANIZATION 
PROVISIONS 
The complexity of the American tax system, the tax code, and the 
reorganization provisions in particular is notorious. Many proposals for 
changes to these provisions have been presented, primarily with the goal 
of shutting down various planning techniques.285 However, only a 
handful of analytical work has been done to evaluate the essence of the 
rules with the goal of fundamental changes, or complete repeal, despite 
these provisions’ apparent lack of theoretical support. As observed by 
Professor Paul in 1940: “The statute imposed objective tests in defining 
reorganizations; these tests furnished Euclidian formulae as to what 
should be done, but said nothing about why.”286 The sole serious 
proposal to repeal the reorganization provisions occurred in 1933. As 
                                                 
 284. See, supra  text accompanying note 8.  
 285. See, e.g., BITTKER  & EUSTICE, supra  note 8, ¶ 12.01[5]. 
 286. PAUL, supra  note 211, at 121 
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mentioned previously, a special Ways and Means Subcommittee 
recommended abolition of the provisions, purely on simplicity and anti-
avoidance grounds.287 The subcommittee acknowledged that the effect 
of these provisions was merely deferral of the payment of the tax and 
mentioned three reasons for the existence of the (then) current regime: 
(1) the exchange and reorganization provisions prevent much of the 
uncertainty and litigation under prior law (around the question whether a 
realization event occurred or not); (2) the discussed transactions are 
merely normal business adjustments and the profits from them are 
merely paper profits that should be exempt in order to not interfere with 
the normal course of business; and (3) it prevents taxpayers from taking 
colorable losses. Nevertheless, the subcommittee concluded that the 
experience of the administration was that the abuse and avoidance 
opportunities far outweigh the advantages above.288 In response to the 
first reason mentioned above, the report relies on the actual experience 
that the law was complex, uncertain, and even harder to administrate 
than prior law. The report accepted the second argument as having some 
merit, but repeated the experience that the abuse outweighs the 
advantages. Structurally, the subcommittee commented that the “system 
is unsound which does not tax gains in the year in which realized,”289 
concluding with the estimation that these provisions result in a 
considerable loss of revenue.290 The committee itself rejected the report, 
concluding that the repeal might result in a revenue loss and preferring 
an opportunistic hole -plugging policy. 
In the next seventy years, only a handful of articles attempted to 
fundamentally criticize the reorganizations regime. In 1938, Milton 
Sandberg explicitly stated that the tax treatment of reorganizations 
amounts to a subsidy of such transactions, adding that “the most striking 
thing of all is that no one can satisfactorily explain why they were ever 
                                                 
 287. H.R. Rep. 73-112, reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra  note 222, at  332. The subcommittee 
added the acknowledgement that, in special cases, exchanges of stock, for instance, may result in 
undue hardship on the taxpayers to pay the tax currently, since no actual cash was received by them 
upon the exchange. In these special cases the subcommittee recommended that the treasury would be 
granted authority to extend the time for payment up to 2 years. The background for this report had 
been the failure of the legislation to implement the alleged policy in the area of corporate 
reorganizations. In the words of Paul: “Elaborately drawn provisions were found to be inadequate 
and ambiguous, and to the extent that they were clear, they were exploited to the limit by diligent tax 
avoiders.” Paul, supra note 211, at 37. 
 288. H.R. Rep. 73-112, reprinted in SEIDMAN , supra note 222, at 334. 
 289. Id at 332. 
 290. Id at 335. 
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enacted or why, having been enacted, they have remained.”291 He 
realized that there is no stated explanation for subsidizing these 
transactions and not other transactions, and that there is not even an 
unstated reason that could plausibly support this subsidy. 292 The most 
quoted article in this line was written by Jerome R. Hellerstein after the 
enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, proposing to eliminate 
the reorganization provisions from the code.293 Hellerstein identified the 
original reasons for reorganizations: the merely-formal-changes 
argument, the hardship-to-taxpayers reason, and the administrative and 
taxpayers’ convenience reason. He also identified the implied efficiency 
justification—that reorganizations are necessary in order to not 
discourage ordinary adjustments and to allow healthy expansion of the 
economy.294 He then argued that none of these reasons could hold fast, 
and that “Congress has not seriously considered the wisdom of granting 
nonrecognition to reorganization exchanges”295 in light of the 1933 
report and all the preparatory work done prior to the enactment of the 
“new” 1954 code. The best proof is in the first, and primary, justification 
for reorganization preferences, since they actually applied (and continue 
to apply today) not only to clear changes in form, but also to a varie ty of 
transactions where “substantial changes in position take place.”296 
Nonrecognition treatment is normally, as it should be, a rare exception in 
our tax law, and narrowly circumscribed. Amazingly, that has not been 
the case where reorganizations are involved, where it was and is granted 
in a most sweeping manner, affecting a large number of transactions and 
substantial amounts of gains and losses.297 The result of this 
extraordinary treatment of reorganizations is “favoritism and 
discrimination” (basically an equitable problem), and it lengthens the 
interval between wealth increases and taxation, i.e., it extends the 
deviation of realization-based income tax from the SHS definition of 
income.298 Hellerstein also rejects the hardship and convenience reasons, 
since these are just difficulties that could be easily solved. Regarding the 
                                                 
 291. Sandberg, supra note 11, at 98. 
 292. Id. at 101–02. 
 293. Hellerstein, supra  note 9, at 254. Interestingly, the House Bill of 1954 unsuccessfully 
attempted to limit the scope of transactions qualifying for the preferential nonrecognition treatment. 
See H.R. 8300, 83d. Cong., §§ 359(b)–(d); Crockett, supra  note 50, at 9-10. 
 294. Hellerstein, supra  note 9, at 276. 
 295. Id. at 259 n.22. 
 296. Id. at 262. 
 297. Id. at 265-266. 
 298. Id. at 271. 
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implied efficiency justification to reorganizations, he shows that no 
evidence has been presented in its support.299 Furthermore, he relies on 
economic studies of the mergers of the first half of the century to show 
an increase in tax-motivated mergers, using stock compensation instead 
of cash. Nevertheless, taxable cash transactions were still significant, and 
tax motives were generally affecting the form of the transaction rather 
than the decision whether to merge. He concluded, therefore, that there is 
no evidence that reorganizations are actually efficiency increasing, nor is 
there evidence to support the notion that their elimination would “impose 
a significant barrier to the expansion or health of our economy.”300 
Congress ignored all of these arguments and kept (in the 1954 code) 
things as they were, following the uneducated path of its 1934 
predecessor. I chose to discuss Hellerstein’s arguments at length, since, 
unfortunately, they are as relevant today as they were 45 years ago. 
In 1976, Professor Crockett reviewed once again the original and 
other justifications for the tax subsidy to reorganizations, concluding that 
reorganizations are “no longer necessarily beneficial to the economy,”301 
referring back to Sandberg and Hellerstein,302 and further determining 
that reorganizations do not serve the “goals of an equitable tax 
structure.”303 In 1985, Professor Posin made yet another contribution, 
focusing on the notorious complexity of the reorganization provisions, 
conservatively suggesting caution, in spite of the shortcomings of a 
“known” system.304 Unfortunately, he supported his suggestion only 
with the observation that such an overhaul may result in making the 
system worse, without actual analysis or specific improvement 
proposals.305 In 1989, Professor Coven reached the conclusion that “the 
need to quite generally overhaul the taxation of corporate acquisitions is 
entirely evident.”306 He ably argued that such overhaul must include a 
comprehensive solution to all corporate acquisitions, specifically 
promoting a mandatory carryover basis system for all such 
transactions.307 
                                                 
 299. Id. at 277. 
 300. Id. at 279. 
 301. Crockett, supra  note 50, at 26. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 29. 
 304. Posin, supra  note 203, at 1407–08. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Coven, supra note 10, at 203. 
 307. Id. 
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One would expect that this visible criticism,308 despite its relative 
thinness throughout the years, would be more influentia l, or, at least, 
ignite a lively debate. This is a major part of our tax law, and it is 
criticized as intellectually unfounded. However, that has not been the 
case, and the critique remains basically unanswered.309 
 
 
                                                 
 308. Most of the literature appeared in leading legal publications.  See supra  notes 292–99, 
305–06.    
 309. I found one interesting response to Hellerstein. John Dane Jr., of the Department of 
Corporations and Taxation of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in The Case for Nonrecognition 
of Gain in Reorganization Exchanges,  TAXES 244 (April 1958), argued against Hellerstein’s 
criticism of the reorganization provisions that it is not fair to tax a taxpayer on a gain from a 
nonvoluntary transaction. Mr. Dane’s experience in Massachusetts, where the law taxed 
reorganizations, supported, in his opinion, the Federal treatment. He admitted that such unfairness 
can be remedied, but seemed to ignore this in his conclusion, failing to support it with other 
explanations or empirical evidence from his experience. This criticism is interesting, since it may 
inspire further study of parallel systems that do tax reorganizations. I found no such existing study. 
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